116 



which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of happi- 

 ness or misery. And therefore, were the Author of nature 

 to propose nothing to himself, as end, but the production of 

 happiness, were his moral character merely that of benevo- 

 lence; yet ours is not so". 1 Butler feared the danger of giving 

 pleasure too high a place, and consequently he brought in 

 conscience as an authority in order to show that certain goods 

 were higher than pleasure. 



On the other hand, is there a possibility that conscience 

 and self-love should ever come into conflict? "Reasonable 

 self-love and conscience, " according to Butler, "are the chief 

 or superior principles in the nature of man : because an action 

 may be suitable to this nature, though all other principles be 

 violated; but becomes unsuitable if either of those are. Con- 

 science and self-love, as we understand our true happiness, 

 always lead us the same way." 2 However, if there ever 

 should be any connection between the two, which Butler con- 

 tends is impossible, conscience would have to give way; since 

 "our ideas of happiness and misery are of all our ideas the 

 nearest and most important to us." Such ideas "ought to 

 prevail", for, "when we sit down in a cool hour, we can 

 neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit till we 

 are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not 

 contrary to it". 



Ultimately, then, it would seem that self-love is the 

 fundamental principle of moral action. Butler, however, 

 would not admit this, but treats the two principles of self-love 

 and conscience as so far co-ordinate in authority that it is not 

 "according to nature" that either should be over-ruled; and 

 therefore, he contends that it is impossible such a conflict 

 should ever take place. 



It is interesting to note that when Butler comes to the dis- 

 cussion of the judgments of conscience as given in the 

 "Dissertation upon virtue" appended to the Analogy, and 

 published ten years after the 'Sermons' that he takes up a 

 position just the opposite to that in which it is maintained 

 that happiness takes precedence over conscience in case of a 

 possible conflict. The dictates of conscience, it is urged, are 

 quite clear and certain, while the calculations of self-interest 

 lead to merely probable conclusions. These dictates of con- 

 science make it certain that duty is always superior to worldly 

 interest, and in such a case of conflict "the more certain obliga- 

 tion must entirely supersede and destroy the less certain". 



iS.B. 249. 

 2 S.B. S 226. 



