117 



But it is not possible that such a conflict should ever occur. 

 Unless proof to the contrary should be shown, we must believe 

 them to be harmonious. 



8. HUTCHESON. 



The next writer, Francis Hutcheson, 1 follows more directly 

 from Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury had sought to prove that 

 morality is a balance between the selfish and the social affec- 

 tions. Hutcheson, however, states that morality cannot con- 

 sist in a mere harmony of egoistic and social impulses; such a 

 view is contradicted by the unconditional preference which 

 our judgment always give to sympathy above all selfish in- 

 clinations. Our approval is won, not by a harmony among 

 different affections, but by the predominance of purely disin- 

 terested love over all other impulses. 



Acts of the will are selfish or benevolent according as one's 

 own good, or the good of others, is pursued. There are two 

 calm natural determinations of the will; the first, a constant 

 impulse towards one's own highest perfection and happiness; 

 the second, towards the universal happiness of others. There 

 are also turbulent passions and appetites, whose end is their 

 simple gratification. 



Hutcheson rebuts the idea that generous affections are 

 selfish, because, according to a "Publick Sense" we are 

 "pleased with the Happiness of others," and are "uneasy at 

 their Misery". Having thus accepted the existence of purely 

 disinterested affections, and divided them into calm and turbu- 

 lent, Hutcheson puts the question, Whether the selfish or 

 benevolent principle should yield in case of opposition? And 

 though it seems that the universal is preferred to the individual 

 happiness by the Deity, in the order of the world, this is not 

 sufficient unless by some determination of the soul we are made 

 to comply with the Divine intentions. This leads on to the 

 consideration of the Moral Faculty. 



The victory of the altruistic impulses can occur only with 

 the aid of a peculiar emotion of approbation, which associates 

 itself with every benevolent instinct. This emotion is the 

 Moral Sense, and is described by Hutcheson as follows: "The 

 Author of Nature has determin'd us to receive, by our ex- 

 ternal Senses, pleasant or disagreeable Ideas of Objects, 

 according as they are useful or hurtful to our Bodys; and to 

 receive from uniform Objects the Pleasures of Beauty and 

 Harmony to excite us to the Pursuit of Knowledge, and to 

 reward us for it ; or to be an argument to us of his Goodness, 



1 1694-1747. 



