118 



as the Uniformity itself proves his Existence, whether he had 

 a Sense of Beauty in Uniformity or not: in the same manner he 

 has given us a Moral Sense, to direct our actions, and to give 

 us still nobler Pleasures; so that while we are only intending 

 the Good of others, we undesignedly promote our own greatest 

 private Good." 1 



Such a moral sense is not referred to any other quality 

 observable by our other senses, or by reasoning. It is not 

 dependent upon bodily organs, but is a settled determination 

 of the soul. 



Thus "Every Action, which we apprehend as either 

 morally good or evil, is always suppos'd to flow from some 

 Affection toward rational Agents; and whatever we call 

 Virtue or Vice, is either some such Affection, or some action 

 consequent upon it".- 



Reason has not, then, as the Intellectual ethics supposes, 

 any primary significance for morals. Its influence is secondary 

 only, teaching us how to discriminate between what is ethically 

 valuable, and what is worthless. 



Before proceeding to Hume, it might be well to sum up 

 the main position of the Moral Sense School. The important 

 fact to note is that the moral sense theory is a theory of motive 

 rather than of criterion. "Approbation," Hufccheson states, 

 "is founded on Benevolence because of some real or apparent 

 Tendency to the Public Good. For we are not to imagine that 

 this Sense should give us, without Observation, Ideas of com- 

 plex Actions, or of their natural Tendencies to Good or Evil: 

 It only determines us to approve Benevolence, whenever it 

 appears in any Action, and to hate the contrary." 3 The 

 theory does not, therefore, aim at assisting us to distinguish 

 right from wrong, but it is really a countertheory to the 

 selfish hypothesis, which is essentially a theory of motives. 

 Virtue is natural, on this theory, because there is in every man 

 a sufficient motive to it. There is some degree of benevolence 

 in all human beings, but purely natural benevolence is weak 

 or partial. It is strengthened and corrected by the moral 

 sense, which adds a novel and exquisite pleasure to that which 

 accompanies the gratification of any natural impulse. Hut- 

 cheson insists on this as against the selfish theory, maintaining 

 that virtue, or benevolence, is made our greatest happiness, 

 apart from any external consequences, by the action of the 

 moral sense. 



^.B. 87. 

 2 S.B. 89. 

 3 S.B. 136. 



