120 



attempts have been made to that purpose". 1 It is, thus, on a 

 principle of disinterested action, belonging to our nature, 

 that Hume founds the chief part of our sentiments of moral 

 approbation. 



But that our actions may be disinterested in this sense, 

 does not mean that they are immediately approved without 

 regard to consequences, and herein lies the essential difference 

 between Hutcheson's ethical doctrine and Hume's. The 

 factor of utility is present in all our moral determinations. 

 "It appears to be a matter of fact, that the circumstance of 

 utility in all subjects is a source of praise and approbation: 

 that it is constantly appealed to in all moral decisions con- 

 cerning the merit and dement of actions: that it is the sole 

 source of that high regard paid to justice, fidelity, honour, 

 allegiance, and chastity: that it is inseparable from all the 

 other social virtues, humanity, generosity, charity, affability, 

 lenity, mercy, and moderation: and, in a word, it is a founda- 

 tion of the chief part of morals, which has reference to man- 

 kind and our fellow-creatures." 2 



The factor of utility in morals has a special significance for 

 the virtue of justice, as above indicated. Justice is more com- 

 pletely bound up with society than any of the other virtues. 

 For example, Hume contrasts humanity and benevolence with 

 justice and fidelity, the former referring more to the individual, 

 and the latter to society. "The social virtues of humanity and 

 benevolence exert their influence immediately by direct 

 tendency or instinct which chiefly keeps in view the simple 

 object, moving the affections, and comprehends not any 

 scheme or system, nor the consequence resulting from the 

 concurrence, imitation, or examples of others. The case is 

 not the same with the social virtues of justice and fidelity. 

 They are highly useful, or indeed, absolutely necessary to the 

 well-being of mankind: but the benefit resulting from them 

 is not the consequence of every single act, but arises from the 

 whole scheme or system concurred in by the whole or the 

 greater part of society." 3 



It is thus seen that Hume, on the one hand, maintains a 

 principle of disinterested action in his treatment of the his- 

 toric self-regarding and other-regarding virtues, that is "the 

 social virtues of humanity and benevolence". Self-love and 

 benevolence have really been fused into one class of actions. 

 These virtues belong to our nature, and "exert their influence 



x David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals' 

 Reprinted fr. ed. of 1777. Open Court Pub. Co., Chicago, p. 54, footnote. 

 2 O.C. p. 66. 

 3 O.C. pp. 146-7. 



