121 



immediately". There are, however, certain virtues that do 

 not, in this way, belong to our nature, namely, "the social vir- 

 tues of justice and fidelity." These latter virtues have refer- 

 ence to "the whole scheme or system concurred in by the 

 whole, or the greater part of society". This may be seen in 

 the following: "Men's inclinations, their necessities, lead them 

 to combine ; their understanding and their experience tell them 

 that this combination is impossible where each governs him- 

 self by no rules, and pays no regard to the possessions of 

 others, and from these passions and reflections, conjoined, as 

 soon as are observed like passions and reflections in others, 

 the sentiment of justice, throughout all ages, has infallibly 

 and certainly had place to some degree or other in every 

 individual of the human species." 1 



Justice is not, then, an original virtue. If every man were 

 animated by benevolence toward all, or if nature had provided 

 bountifully for all needs, the virtue of justice would be super- 

 fluous. "The rules of equity and justice," Hume states, 

 "depend entirely on the particular state and condition in 

 which men are placed, and owe their origin and existence to 

 that utility which results to the public from their strict and 

 regular observance." 2 In fact "the necessity of justice to the 

 support of societies is the sole foundation of that virtue." 3 



The observance of justice, however, is not referred by 

 Hume to an express compact, as was done by Hobbes, but to 

 a gradually attained convention similar in kind to that by 

 which Language and Currency must be conceived to have 

 come into existence, or, to the silent agreement between the 

 various rowers in a boat. Yet it is evident that Hume main- 

 tains Hobbes' view of the artificiality of the state. "Examine 

 the writers," he says, "on the laws of nature, and you will 

 always find that whatever principles they set out with ^ they 

 are sure to terminate here at last, and to assign as the ultimate 

 reason for every rule which they establish, the convenience 

 and necessities of mankind. What other reason, indeed, could 

 writers ever give, why this must be mine, and that yours, 

 since uninstructed nature surely never gave any such distinc- 

 tions?" 4 



In Hobbes the whole system of social relations was seen 

 to be derived from individual calculation, as is the case with 

 justice in Hume's system. Hobbes' justification for the state 

 was the benefit which it afforded the individual. It was natural 



KXC. p. 150. 

 2 O.C. p. 20. 

 'O.C. p. 37. 

 4 O.C. pp. 28-9. 



