122 



that the individual should seek his own preservation, and the 

 commonwealth was the best, indeed the only, means to that 

 end. The individual's concern about the welfare of others 

 is not given any place, except in so far as he observes the civil 

 laws which are in the interest of all. As a result of the analysis 

 of the Moral Sense theorists, however, the welfare of others 

 so far as this is contained within the scope of benevolence 

 came to be recognized as an object which it was as natural 

 for the individual to seek as his own personal welfare. With 

 this position, it has been seen, Hume is in fundamental agree- 

 ment, that is, as far as benevolence is concerned. But for 

 Hume, justice still remains an 'artificial' virtue. It cannot be 

 reckoned with the natural virtues; it is no original attribute 

 of man; it does not spring from spontaneous feeling, but pre- 

 supposes reason and deliberation. 



The Intellectualists or Intuitionists, in their contentions 

 against the Moral Sense school, have always enjoyed in 'jus- 

 tice' a virtue which has served well as a support for their 

 theory. The Sentimentalists have not been able to account 

 for it. Hume attempts to explain it on practically the same 

 basis as Hobbes. But it may be, that instead of relegating any 

 moral virtue to the realm of the 'artificial', all such virtues 

 may be seen to be natural, even that of justice. That is to 

 say, it may be that a still further analysis of human nature 

 may show that the individual in society is, in all respects, 

 naturally a social individual. 



10. ADAM SMITH. 



Adam Smith supplements Hume at this point, by postu- 

 lating 'sympathy' as the foundation of all moral virtues, 

 justice included. Hume indeed had contended for this sym- 

 pathetic factor, as has been seen. "No man," he states, "is 

 absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of others. 

 The first has a natural tendency to give pleasure ; the second 

 pain. This, every one may find in himself." 1 But, although 

 such a position is evident in Hume, for Adam Smith, the social 

 nature of the individual is the burden of his whole system. 



Adam Smith bases his whole theory on the feelings. Re- 

 turning to the views of Hutcheson, his former teacher, he 

 extends these views, and at the same time connects them with 

 the investigations of Hume. The moral faculty is set forth 

 as practically identical with the power of sympathy. Man is 

 a moral being in proportion as he can enter into, and realize 

 the feelings, sentiments, and opinions of others. 



XD.C. p. 54, footnote. 



