130 



Whence then is the origin of the qualitative distinction be- 

 tween pleasures? Apparently the pleasures "preferable in 

 kind" are those derived from the higher faculties. But in 

 what way are we able to distingush one faculty as higher and 

 another as lower? Evidently "the feelings and judgment of 

 the experienced" "those best furnished with the means of 

 comparison", are to be our guides. Now it would seem that 

 in introducing "judgment" as well as feeling, in the estimation 

 of pleasures, Mill has in mind, not so much the difference be- 

 tween pleasures, as the point of view from which such pleasures 

 are to be regarded. That point of view is represented by 

 society. The individual must be interpreted socially, not only 

 in the matter of feeling, but also as regards his status as a 

 member of society. In the above quotation it is evident that 

 the reason why one pleasure is chosen as higher than, or differ- 

 ent in kind from another, is not simply because it is subjectively 

 felt as higher, but also because it is objectively judged higher. 

 Not only the feelings but the judgment of the experienced are 

 necessary. As a member of society, the individual's actions 

 are of the utmost importance to society, for such actions affect 

 the whole body of society, of which the individual is a part. 

 The consequences of an action, as bearing upon the other mem- 

 bers of society, must be considered. As an injury to one part 

 of the body will, more or less, throw the entire body out of 

 gear, so society is affected by the actions of its component 

 parts. An action expanded into its consequences forces one 

 beyond the limits of immediate feeling. Something more than 

 such feeling is needed for the estimation of action, namely, 

 'judgment', or rational insight. 



Because of the great emphasis which Mill lays upon the 

 consequences of an action, in determining its moral worth, he 

 has been attacked as advocating a doctrine of mere expediency. 

 In replying to such objectors, however, Mill says: " It would 

 often be expedient, for the purpose of getting over some mo- 

 mentary embarrassment, or attaining some object immediately 

 useful to ourselves or others, to tell a lie. But inasmuch as 

 the cultivation within ourselves of a sensitive feeling on the 

 subject of veracity is one of the most useful, and the enfeeble- 

 ment of that feeling one of the most hurtful, things to which 

 our conduct can be instrumental ; and inasmuch as any, even 

 unintentional, deviation from truth does that much towards 

 weakening the trustworthiness of human assertion, which 

 is not only the principal support of all present social well-being 

 but the insufficiency of which does more than any one thing 

 that can be named to keep back civilization, virtue, every- 



