134 



words, every man's will should so legislate as to make a perfect 

 moral and social order possible. Each will, in its decisions, 

 should legislate in accordance with the idea of a social system, 

 a kingdom of ends, in which each individual is an end in 

 himself. 



This standpoint of the organic view of society may be seen 

 to be the source of a great deal that is common to both Kant 

 and Mill. In Mill's theory this may be illustrated by refer- 

 ence to his treatment of Justice. In consonance with the 

 distinction previously drawn between what may be termed 

 the subjective and objective in the social relations of men, Mill 

 distinguishes here between the idea, and the feeling which ac- 

 companies the idea, of justice. 1 The idea of justice is em- 

 bodied in the following: "Justice implies something which it is 

 not only right to do and wrong not to do, but which some in- 

 dividual person can claim from us as his moral right. * 

 Wherever there is a right, the case is one of justice, and not 

 of the virtue of beneficence." 2 



" By virtue of his superior intelligence, even apart from his 

 superior range of sympathy, a human being is capable of ap- 

 prehending a community of interest between himself and the 

 human society of which he forms a part, such that any con- 

 duct which threatens the security of the society generally is 

 threatening to his own, and calls forth his instinct (if instinct 

 it be) of self-defence. The same superiority of intelligence, 

 joined to the power of sympathizing with human beings gen- 

 erally, enables him to attach himself to the collective idea of 

 his tribe, his country, or mankind, in such a manner that any 

 act hurtful to them raises his instinct of sympathy, and urges 

 him to resistance. " 3 



"The sentiment of justice in that one of its elements which 

 consists of the desire to punish, is thus, I conceive, the natural 

 feeling of retaliation or vengeance, rendered by intellect and 

 sympathy, applicable to those injuries, that is, to those 

 hurts which wound us through, or in common with, society at 

 large. This sentiment in itself, has nothing moral in it; 

 what is moral is the exclusive subordination of it to the social 

 sympathies, so as to wait on and obey their call. For the 

 natural feeling would make us resent indiscriminately what- 

 ever any one does that is disagreeable to us; but when moral- 

 ized by the social feeling it only acts in the directions conform- 

 able to the general good. " 4 



^'Utilitarianism" p. 75. 



2 Ibid. 



3 O.C. p. 77. 



