135 



If one makes allowance for difference in terminology, the 

 similarity of Kant's position with the statement just quoted 

 from Mill may readily be seen. Sentiment, or feeling, in 

 itself Kant's 'desire' has nothing moral in it. But what is 

 moral is the fact that one member of society realizes himself 

 as a member, and therefore exclusively subordinates his own 

 particular feeling to the 'social sympathies 'so as to wait upon 

 and obey their call or, in Kant's terminology, acting so that 

 the law of one's action may be law universal. Natural 

 feeling one's own personal desires "would make us resent 

 indiscriminately whatever any one does that is disagreeable to 

 us; but when moralized by the social feeling", that is to say, 

 when one's particular feelings are subjected to control in view 

 of the fact that there are other members of society, "it only 

 acts in the directions conformable to the general good". 

 That the result of this action in conformity to the general 

 good is closely parallel to Kant's universal formula, may be 

 seen in the instances which Kant uses to illustrate his formula 

 a man in despair asking his reason if it would be contrary 

 to reason if he took his own life; and again, a man wanting to 

 borrow money, knowing that he will not be able to repay it. 

 If such actions were universalized, the possibility of a moral 

 life would cease. 



It will thus have been seen that Mill has in view, in treating 

 of both the ultimate sanction and the standard of morality, 

 the organic nature of society. On the one hand, the ulti- 

 mate sanction is found to inhere in the "social feelings" of 

 mankind, and to a large extent is made to serve the same pur- 

 pose as the factor of "sympathy" in Adam Smith's theory. 

 The standard of morality, on the other hand, utility in- 

 volves the bringing in of a distinction in kind between different 

 pleasures, and this was seen to depend ultimately upon ra- 

 tional insight "the test of quality, and the rule for measur- 

 ing it against quantity being the preference felt by those who 

 in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added 

 their habits of self-consciousness and self -observation, are 

 best furnished with the means of comparison". On such a 

 basis the way seems open for a reconciliation of the fundamen- 

 tal truth both of Intuitionism and of Utilitarian Empiricism. 



III. CRITICAL ESTIMATION OF FOREGOING. 



Having now traced these two lines of ethical theory from 

 Hobbes to the present day, it will be well to see if the truth 

 from each cannot be gleaned, and brought into reconcili- 

 ation with a possible ethical theory which endeavours to ad- 



