141 



every single individual is fully conscious of such an idea, for, 

 as Mill has stated, "the great majority of good actions are 

 intended, not for the benefit of the world, but for that of in- 

 dividuals, of which the good of the world is made up; and the 

 thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on these occasions 

 travel beyond the particular persons concerned, except so far 

 as to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating 

 the rights, that is, the legitimate and authorized expectations, 

 of any one else." 



SUMMARY. 



In the second section of the thesis the ethical problem has 

 been traced through the main schools of British ethics, and a 

 critical estimate given regarding it. We believe that our 

 analysis is sufficiently exhaustive and accurate to prove: First, 

 that the fact of preference must be recognized as the basis 

 upon which all ethical theories must build. At the same time 

 we believe that it is just the investigation of the conditions 

 under which this preference occurs which should form the 

 foundation for ethical theory. That is, it is not satisfactory to 

 accept, on mere statement, any conclusion as to what is pre- 

 ferred. Among the theories which hold that pleasure, utility, 

 preservation of life, etc., are the only conditions preferred, it 

 is not necessary to make a choice, until, through an analysis 

 which we believe has yet to be made, it has been determined 

 that one or more of these is actually preferred. Second, 

 that moral progress consists in proceeding from a moral 

 judgment in which a comparatively small number is in- 

 volved, to a judgment which comprehends in the well-being 

 of society, the well-being also of each member of society. 

 This well-being of society, as a characteristic of developed 

 moral judgment, is, we take it, of prime concern for our present 

 discussion, for the question which arises is, since as a matter 

 of fact moral progress has been a development away from a 

 mere individual well-being to a social welfare, can the method 

 which we have discussed as an evolutionary method, deal with 

 the fact of such progress? Is it not, by its very nature, com- 

 pelled to restrict itself to those processes which take place in 

 the individual as an organism, and which, at last, centre in the 

 welfare of the individual as such? Can such an individual as 

 is described by either Darwin or Spencer ever develop to the 

 point where his judgment could be dominated by the consider- 

 ation of the welfare of society as a whole? So far as we can see, 

 the method which we are examining, begins with an individual, 

 and can only include anything outside of that individual in so 

 far as that something is bound up in the individual's immediate 



