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sense of well-being. It cannot proceed from such an individual 

 sense of well-being to the welfare of society, unless it be ad- 

 mitted from the outset that the individual's sense of well- 

 being coincides with the welfare of society as a whole; or, 

 otherwise expressed, unless it be admitted that the opposition 

 between an individual and society, in a moral sense at least, is 

 invalid. And third, we have seen that morality and society 

 must exist together. In the state of nature, as discussed by 

 Hobbes, there could be nothing that we could call morality. 

 Such judgments can only occur in a society, if our view be 

 correct that morality is, by its very nature, concerned with the 

 welfare of society as a whole. 



This conclusion carries with it the view that, morally 

 speaking, there is no mere individual. The moral man is, per- 

 force, a social being. The question, then, with regard to the 

 relation of the natural state to the moral or social state, is 

 really a question about this social nature of man. Our con- 

 tention is, no matter how such a social nature has come to be, 

 that is, no matter what its history may have been, it demands, 

 when it exists, that we recognize that it cannot be dealt with 

 completely, or even essentially, through the physiological 

 organism alone, that is, for such conceptions, the spacial re- 

 lation of an organism and its environment is not even a good 

 analogy by which to elucidate the relation of the individual 

 and society. 



We find, then, in the consideration of a specific ethical 

 content, added difficulty for an evolutionary method, such as 

 we have been discussing. If it is difficult, even impossible, for 

 such a method to deal with facts of consciousness at all, it is 

 obviously doubly difficult for it to deal with such facts as those 

 which the history of ethics discloses as the specific moral facts. 



