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in existence), instead of leading to the views held by the evo- 

 lutionists as the foundation for their psychology, these results 

 lead, in the facts of sensation, of feeling, of space, of association, 

 etc., in a very different direction. From this standpoint it is 

 quite as possible to think of psychology as having a strong 

 influence upon the speculations of physiologists, as it is to 

 think of the results of physiology being the essential deter- 

 minants in a psychological theory. That is, it is quite as 

 proper to speak of a psychological physiology as of a physio- 

 logical psychology. 



This last conclusion leads us one step further. If one thinks 

 of an ideal for science as a conception in which all the investiga- 

 tions of man are expressed in terms of the same elements, why 

 is it not more reasonable to look for these ultimates in psy- 

 chology, which at least tries to recognize all the facts of human 

 experience at their face value, than to look for them in the 

 physical sciences which began their modern history in the 

 seventeenth century by explicitly leaving certain facts of 

 human experience (namely, sensations, feelings, volitions, etc.) 

 out of account, and which, so far as their ultimates are con- 

 cerned, have continued to do so to the present time? Without 

 seeking, in the least, to suggest a criticism of the methods or 

 results of physical science within the sphere which it has so 

 evidently made its own, one may protest very directly against 

 a procedure all too common in the speculations of physical 

 scientists, namely, that which leads to an explicit or veiled 

 materialism which is built upon the assumption that the 

 ultimates accepted by the physical sciences are the only 

 possible ultimates in which to express any fact accurately, 

 that is, scientifically. While it is granted that physical science 

 had made enormo'us strides before a scientific psychology 

 came into existence, we cannot admit that this fact gives these 

 sciences any right of priority whatever from a logical point of 

 view, and that is just what modern materialism in any form 

 has always tacitly assumed. While we do not contend that 

 the considerations which we have advanced have, of necessity, 

 either disproved materialism or even attempted to establish 

 any other theory, we do contend that our conclusions are of 

 such a nature that they might well lead any one to seriously 

 examine the basis upon which materialism, as a conception of 

 the universe, is founded. 



In the second part of our thesis we were concerned with 

 purely ethical questions which, as in the first part, have led to 

 a negative result so far as our main problem is concerned; 

 namely, we believe we have shown that the method used by 

 evolutionists in dealing with the problems of ethics is not 



