that they write down the initial letters of the two words, justice 

 and injustice, and then place under these the different actions 

 corresponding to each, Euthydemus quite readily assents. In the 

 second column are entered such actions as lying, deceit, the en- 

 slavement of free-born men. These, Euthydemus says, clearly 

 belong to the injustice category. But Socrates replies there are 

 instances which appear to contradict this classification, for in 

 time of war it is considered just to exhibit all these characteristics 

 against enemies. Our conception of unjust acts must be modified 

 to mean such acts as lying, deceit, etc., when practised against 

 friends. But Socrates now gets Euthydemus to agree that, under 

 certain circumstances, it is just to deceive a friend; for example, 

 a general, to revive the courage of his demoralised troops, makes a 

 false announcement of approaching allies, the anxious father ad- 

 ministers by deceit the distasteful medicine to his sick son, the knife 

 is stolen from the friend who might use it in a moment of mental 

 aberration to his own destruction. Therefore the above actions 

 are only unjust when done with the intention of injuring the 

 persons affected by them. Euthydemus is thus led to see the 

 complexity of the situation, and the inadequacy and self-contra- 

 dictoriness of common opinions, and, though, in this special case, 

 a formal definition does not result, there is well illustrated the 

 general procedure whichrSocrates followed in leading toward such 

 definitions. 



If one turns to the third book of the same work, he finds in 

 the third chapter a more complete illustration of the Socratic 

 method. Socrates is conversing with a youth, who has just been 

 elected hipparch or commandant of cavalry. He discovers to the 

 young man that his object in desiring such a position was neither 

 to ride at the head of the knights nor to obtain public notoriety, 

 for even the mounted archers do the former and a madman might 

 boast the distinction of the latter. His object has been rather to 

 improve the cavalry, to hand it over to the state in better condition 

 than he found it. Such an object can be achieved, Socrates points 

 out, only if the hipparch improves both the horses and the riders, 

 inculcating those qualities which will make them suited for battle. 

 "And, have you troubled your head at all", says Socrates, "to 

 consider how you are to secure the obedience of your men? For, 



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