of Plato paint the situations with greater imaginative detail, and 

 the plan employed follows often a devious and intricate path, but 

 the general method and the general results are practically the same. 

 In the Republic the nature of justice is again the query; in 

 the Theaetetus it is the nature of knowledge. In both cases there 

 are advanced by certain of the audience current definitions, which 

 Socrates critically considers and shows, finally, to be inadequate 

 to evident facts. In the Republic, for example, justice is first 

 defined as the payment of debts, which afterwards is interpreted as 

 the rendering of good to friends and evil to enemies. To deter- 

 mine who are friends and who are enemies is, however, by no means 

 easy, and so the definition is revised to read, it is just to do good to 

 our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when 

 they are evil. Against this conclusion however it is objected 

 that by injury men, no less than dogs and horses, are made worse, 

 that is, less just and the paradoxical character of the result neces- 

 sarily leads to a further revision. Here the character, Thrasym- 

 achus, rushes in with his rather hasty suggestion, justice is the 

 interest of the stronger. Governments make laws for their own 

 advantage; justice is obedience to these laws. But Socrates points 

 out that the stronger are not always infallible, and so, sometimes, 

 may misunderstand their own interests, which would lead to legis- 

 lation that would be to their own hurt; furthermore, it appears that, 

 if the analogy of the physician and pilot be permissible, those that 

 govern, or the stronger, legislate for the interest of the governed, 

 or the weaker, so that the definition of Thrasymachus cannot be con- 

 sidered adequate. When Socrates, after thus removing false de- 

 finitions and clearing the ground of presuppositions, commences to 

 formulate his own definition, the poet-philosopher gives to his 

 imagination full play. The nature of justice is sought, first, in 

 the state, where perchance its nature will be written in larger char- 

 acters. It is however only after he has constructed his ideal 

 Republic and defined wisdom, courage and temperance that Plato, 

 through the mouth of Socrates, at last happens upon the nature of 

 justice. It is suggested by the principle of the division of labour 

 within the state. When each one has and does his rightful share 

 then is justice realised. Turning now to the individual, Socrates 

 distinguishes in the soul three parts. Even as in the state, justice 



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