matter. In other words, throughout the whole process of 

 there is a movement from the less actual to the actual, or rather, as 

 Aristotle says, from Potentiality to Actuality. It is, however, 

 impossible for Aristotle to. conclude that pure actuality unmixed 

 with potentiality, or form unmixed with matter is unnecessary for 

 development, and here the Stagirite advances that portion of his 

 argument which leads him finally into the very same difficulty 

 which Plato had experienced. Individual things arise in the pro- 

 cess of development because of the joint operation of form and 

 matter ; the gradual preponderance of form constitutes the gradual 

 ascent in the scale of being. But what about the first and the last 

 stage in the process? Are there pure matter and pure form? 

 Aristotle calls the last remainder after abstraction, as one goes down 

 in the scale, first matter, Trpco-n? uX??. It is the bare potentiality of all 

 that is actualised in the realm of change, is merely inferred, and can 

 be known, if at all, only by analogy. On the other hand, as one 

 ascends in the scale, there is pure 'form, or pure actuality, and 

 Aristotle insists that without such a conception there could be no 

 movement at all. Logically, pure actuality, he holds, must be first, 

 for without such a conception there could be no movement, since 

 all movement implies an efficient cause. The series of causes cannot 

 be infinite and so he posits a first mover, itself unmoved. This 

 first unmoved mover is, for Aristotle, God. He is pure actuality, 

 pure form and, since to say that he contemplates the realm of exist- 

 ent things would be to determine him 1 by something outside, 

 Aristotle is led to say that the prime mover is vor)<TL$ I/OTJCTCWS, 

 thought of thought, pure contemplation. 



In this aspect of his teaching, it will be seen that Aristotle 

 approaches the Platonic doctrine. Indeed, it may be said that the 

 Idea of the Good in Plato is, in no sense, different from the prime 

 mover of Aristotle. In separating this prime mover from the things 

 of sense Aristotle commits the very same mistake, if mistake, it 

 be, for which he so drastically has criticized Plato. Furthermore, if 

 Plato had difficulty in stating the relation of ideas to things, and 

 could be accused by his pupil, Aristotle, of using, in his explanation, 

 metaphors only, such as imitation and participation, no less had 

 Aristotle difficulty in explaining the relation of his prime mover to 



1 Cf. Meta. XII Ch. 9. 



55 



