Philosophy, then, may be defined as the scientific attempt to 

 form a world-view, which gives a rightful place to all the known 

 facts. Now, though it is apparent that both Plato and Aristotle 

 attempt just such a task, yet it must not be overlooked that the 

 definition, which each gives of philosophy, seems to suggest a 

 different function for that discipline. These definitions have al- 

 ready been stated. For Plato, the philosopher is he who sets his 

 affections upon that which in each case really exists, which becomes 

 tantamount to saying that the philosopher is he who sets his affec- 

 tions on the Ideas, and philosophy then would seem for Plato to 

 consist in the contemplation of these Ideas. Philosophy, first 

 philosophy, for Aristotle is the science of being as such. But these 

 definitions are not intrinsically different from that given above. 

 In the case of Plato, the Ideas are the supposed explanations of 

 the world of sense. It may be difficult for him to tell just in what 

 way they are so explanatory, but, nevertheless, that is his firm 

 belief. He who contemplates the Ideas is, therefore, endeavouring 

 thereby to understand the universe and to form a complete view of 

 the same. Again, in the case of Aristotle, being as such was his 

 phrase for the common basis of all things. The four principles or 

 causes of being which resulted from his analysis he uses to explain 

 all, and, therefore, the science of being as such is for him that 

 science which endeavours to give a complete account of the known 

 facts. Thus, in the development of human thought which, in the 

 period just covered, finds, in a sense, its culmination in Plato and 

 Aristotle, "we have a final definition of philosophy being evolved. 



If it be objected that the subject-matter and aim of philosophy 

 are different from those just outlined, that philosophy does not 

 have as its subject-matter the content and mode of prpcedure of the 

 sciences, and that it does not attempt to co-ordinate all the known 

 facts into a world-view, then, it must be asked, what else is philoso- 

 phy, what other than this is its subject-matter and what its aim ? 



It has already been suggested that, before the differentiation of 

 the general background of thought into the special sciences had 

 taken place, there was, strictly speaking, neither science nor phil- 

 osophy. The work of Thales, for example, was for him neither 

 philosophy nor science. Seeing that his general aim was to form 

 a world-theory, they who lived contemporaneous with or subse- 



58 



