very introduction to his principles, "It is agreed on all hands that 

 the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them 

 apart by itself, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it 

 were, and blended together, several in the same object" 1 ; and 

 again in the same paragraph, "there is perceived by sight an object 

 extended, coloured and moved". Words could hardly be plainer 

 in denying that there are given to the mind simple ideas, which are 

 by it combined. His whole argument against the possibility of per- 

 ceiving abstract ideas, including, of course, the abstract ideas of 

 qualities, serves only to substantiate this interpretation of Berke- 

 ley's words. That Hume held a similar doctrine can hardly be 

 doubted 2 and, until those who think otherwise are better able to 

 support their theory from the writings of the men themselves, we 

 prefer to accept the above interpretation, believing it to be more 

 in accord with the facts of the case. Even if it were granted that 

 Berkeley and Hume did not fully realize that particular objects or 

 things are themselves, like the simple ideas, results of abstraction 

 from the given whole of experience, yet such a mistake on their part 

 would not leave them open to the criticism referred to above, viz., 

 that they, like Locke, committed the simple-idea error. 



But Berkeley did make the mistake however of assuming that 

 ideas, though not given to the mind simple and uncompounded, are 

 dependent upon a spirit, in which they subsist. For he says that 

 ideas are "inert, fleeting or dependent beings, which subsist not by 

 themselves, but are supported by, or exist in, minds or spiritual 

 substances". 3 Hume, however, saw no reason for assuming the 

 dependence of ideas upon an immaterial substance. The very 

 arguments Berkeley used to disprove a material substance, Hume 

 claimed, disprove also an immaterial substance. Since matter is 

 not perceived, for, if it were, it would be an idea, it is therefore non- 

 existent; similarly, since spirit is not perceived, it likewise is non- 

 existent. This argument of Hume is especially cogent on account 

 of the manner in which Berkeley had given an account of the per- 

 ceiving spirit for, having identified existence with perceived things, 

 that is ideas, spirit was not among any of the ideas and therefore 

 lay outside the realm of existence. There are in the understanding 



Par. 7. 



1 Cf. A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part 1, Sec. 7. 



* Consequences of the Principles, Par. 89. 



84 



