"Philosophers are so far from rejecting the opinion of a continued 

 existence upon rejecting that of the independence and continuance 

 of our sensible perceptions, that though all sects agree in the latter 

 sentiment, the former, which is, in a manner, its necessary con- 

 sequence, has been peculiar to a few extravagant sceptics; who 

 after all maintained that opinion in words only, and were never 

 able to bring themselves sincerely to believe it". 1 The belief in 

 an independent and continued existence is one that has taken such 

 deep root "that it is impossible", Hume declares, "ever to eradi- 

 cate it, nor will any strained metaphysical conviction of the depend- 

 ence of our perceptions be sufficient for that purpose". 2 All that 

 reason can do is to ascertain what causes induce us to believe in the 

 existence of body; that we do entertain such a belief is for Hume 

 an undeniable fact. 



Now it has been shown above that John Locke commenced his 

 'nvestigations into the human understanding with a similar belief. 

 That Berkeley, too, held to a continuous existence independent of 

 finite minds is demonstrated by his doctrine of the Eternal Spirit. 

 But Locke tried to do two things each of which was impossible. 

 He tried to prove knowledge of these independent existents and he 

 tried likewise to make them the cause of the actually known or 

 perceived facts. Hume, with clearer understanding, saw the futility 

 and impossibility of both these attempts. That which is posited as 

 outside experience 3 cannot, at the same time, be within experience; 

 that which is believed cannot, at the same time, be known. And 

 since causality is a relation only among impressions and ideas, it 

 cannot be predicated as a relation between "thing" or "object" 

 and perception. "The only existences, of which we are certain, are 

 perceptions. . . . As no beings are ever present to the mind but 

 perception, it follows that we may observe a conjunction or a rela- 

 tion of cause and effect between different perceptions, but can 

 never observe it between perceptions and objects. 'Tis impossible, 

 therefore, that from the existence or any of th qualities of the 

 former, we can ever form any conclusion concerning the existence 

 of the latter, or ever satisfy our reason in this particular." 4 No 

 causal relation can be predicated between the known and the 

 unknown. We are left, then, with no knowledge of but a belief in,- 



1 Selby-Bigge's Edn. Pp. 213-4. 



2 Ibid. P. 214. 



1 The word, experience, is used here of course in the sense then given to it. 

 4 Selby-Bigge's Edn. P. 212. 



86 



