tendency evidenced in the latter 's appeal to reason. Leibnitz 

 claimed that our reasonings are founded on two great principles, 

 that of contradiction and that of sufficient reason. "There are also 

 two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and those of fact. Truths 

 of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible; those 

 of fact are contingent, and their opposite is possible." 1 But, though 

 Leibnitz made this distinction in favour of rationalism, yet he held 

 very firmly to what he termed the law of continuity. 2 This belief 

 of his, itself a deduction from his investigations in mathematics, 

 influenced all his thinking. It is seen operating in his Theory of 

 Knowledge. Locke, Leibnitz claimed, was wrong in holding that 

 the mind was originally like a tabula rasa. His error, Leibnitz con- 

 tended, consisted in his overlooking the fact that there are in the 

 mind what Leibnitz called "perceptions petites". 3 These minute 

 perceptions constitute the lowest stage of knowledge. The highest 

 stage of knowledge is that of apperception where ideas are clear 

 and distinct. Moreover, even at the lowest stage, the mind is 

 active, making use involuntarily, instinctively as he claims, of cer- 

 tain principles, which virtually are in the mind always. From these 

 conclusions he argued that nihil est in intellectu quid non fuerit in 

 sensu, nisi ipse intellectus. This rationalistic position of Leibnitz, 

 coupled with the influence of the natural science of his day, influ- 

 enced wonderfully the metaphysical views which he held. 



Des Cartes had treated matter as inert and lifeless. Leibnitz 

 claimed that it is the power of resistance that constitutes the 

 essence of matter and the power of resistance is force. This it is 

 which really exists. There are as many simple, indivisible forces as 

 there are things, and these forces he called monads. Corresponding 

 to the different degrees of knowledge, there is a hierarchy of monads 

 culminating with God the perfect monad. Each monad differs 

 from and excludes all the rest. There are no windows by which 

 anything can enter or depart, but each monad in some degree repre- 

 sents or reflects the universe. But the question arises how can all 

 these monads, each unique in itself, become a universe? By means 

 of the hypothesis of pre-established harmony, Leibnitz asserts a 

 unity in a world which otherwise would appear to be composed of 

 atomic individuals. 



1 The Monadology Par. 33. 



2 Cf. Nouveau Essais IV, 16. 



3 Ibid. Preface. 



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