The different writings of Leibnitz do not contain any systema- 

 tized philosophy. They are, however, especially helpful in sug- 

 gesting solutions of problems and in presenting half-truths which 

 a later age was to develop more fully. It was Wolff, who, with less 

 insight but a greater love of precise definition and classification, 

 endeavoured to put into a system the results of the Leibnitzian 

 teaching. Wolff became exceedingly popular, partly because he 

 delivered his lectures in the German tongue, and partly because he 

 presented a system which seemed to commend itself at once by its 

 completeness and definite terminology. But his teaching was 

 nevertheless too rationalistic, too dogmatic to satisfy the clearer 

 thinkers of the day, and the opposition to such a standpoint, as 

 evidenced in the empiricism of Hume, led to controversy and 

 antagonism, which, however, became fortunately the prelude 

 to a new era in the history of thought, the era known, generally, as 

 that of the critical philosophy. The work of Wolff is mainly sig- 

 nificant for the fact that in the critical discussions of Kant the 

 terminology of Wolff is everywhere applied, and it is the under- 

 standing of the classificatory system of Wolff which in large measure 

 gives intelligibility to the argument of Kant. 



But before the work of Kant, the great representative of this 

 critical philosophy, is delineated, it will be well to pause here 

 in order to ask wherein lies the exact significance of these theories 

 of knowledge for philosophy as a Weltanschauung or world-view. 

 Though it is true that philosophy does not find its essential task 

 in developing a theory of knowledge, yet it is not, by any means, 

 the case that such theories have no relation to the general view 

 of the world which philosophy aims at constructing. Theories 

 of knowledge have been in the history of thought necessary pre- 

 parations for views of the world. By means of their theories of 

 knowledge men have been endeavouring to understand the actual 

 processes which constitute all their experience. Such an investi- 

 gation is a necessary propaedeutic for any comprehensive view 

 of the world, for, without a proper conception of what are the 

 actual determinations of knowledge, no philosophy can hope to 

 be adequate. Empiricism, in approaching this task, was more 

 painstaking and patient than rationalism. The latter seemed 

 anxious to complete its work and tended to leap to conclusions 



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