too rapidly. For that reason, there grew from out the rationalistic 

 tendency a number of philosophic theories which, just because 

 they were not broad-based upon an adequate view of knowledge, 

 a later age was to call dogmatic. Such theories did not take 

 cognizance of all the known facts, being mostly concerned with 

 those regarded as universal and necessary, and, for that reason, 

 were onesided and unsatisfactory. 



Among the world-views, which were held in this period, were 

 some which were dominantly theological in their interests. The 

 consequences of such a condition history had already revealed, 

 but here again, in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth 

 centuries, the mistake was made of subordinating philosophical 

 interests, interests which should be all inclusive and, therefore, 

 subordinate to none, to theological speculation. The result, as 

 evidenced in the deistic, theistic, pantheistic and atheistic beliefs 

 of the time, was satisfactory neither to theology nor to philosophy. 

 Again, philosophy, with some, was unduly handicapped by certain 

 scientific theories. On the one hand, there arose and flourished 

 for a time the materialism already mentioned, a materialism 

 which was influenced by the discoveries in physics and physiology, 

 a materialism which made mind, at times, an attribute of matter, 

 at times, an effect of matter, and again, exactly the same as matter, 

 but which never stopped to face honestly the inconsistencies of 

 its too simple philosophy or to ask itself just what mind and matter 

 actually are from the standpoint of content of knowledge. On 

 the other hand, because of the influence of mathematical and 

 mechanical theory upon his general speculations, Leibnitz suggested 

 a philosophy which has generally been termed a monistic spiritual- 

 ism. All the monads mirror the universe, though not all with an 

 equal degree of clearness. Force he takes to be but another name 

 for self-activity, consciousness, or spirit, and so things, generally 

 regarded as extended and corporeal, are, for Leibnitz, to some 

 degree at least, spirit. Though the Leibnitzian philosophy seems 

 so far removed from that of Des Cartes, who was influenced in 

 his conclusions by both theology and the sciences, yet, after all, 

 it finds its true home in one aspect of his dualism, and the material- 

 ism depicted above may likewise trace its origin back to the other 

 aspect of the self-same source. 



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