experience certain less complex constituent parts. These may be 

 subjected again to analysis and so on, until, finally, having com- 

 menced with the original unitary experience, we come jat last 

 to those constituents which appear to resist further analysis. 

 These may be designated as elements. 



But Kant's view seems to rely not on any such analysis. It 

 is his endeavour apparently to get back of the actual facts which 

 constitute knowledge, and find out their origin or cause. Sensi- 

 bility and understanding, instead of being class-names to denote 

 the products of analysis, he tends to make the origin of the two 

 classes of facts. This seems all the more a correct interpretation of 

 Kant, because of the parenthetical clause in the above statement, 

 which suggests that the two stems may spring from a common 

 root unknown to us. Behind sensibility and understanding there 

 may stand a common origin which then would account for all 

 human knowledge. Now such a procedure, as Kant himself was 

 ready at times to point out, leads away from knowledge and into 

 insuperable difficulties. A system of philosophy which would be 

 adequate must build upon an investigation of the facts. Kant 

 claimed to have produced in his Critique of Pure Reason an intro- 

 duction to such a system. His preliminary suppositions however 

 were bound to lead him astray and to vitiate his conclusions. 



That there are under the general head, knowledge, two classes 

 of facts corresponding, on the one hand, to the facts attributed 

 by Kant to sensibility, and, on the other, to those attributed to 

 understanding might be true. The results of the analysis can 

 alone determine that. But to assume that there are two origins 

 of knowledge by one of which "objects" are given while by the 

 other "thought" is given is purely hypothetical and clearly arbi- 

 trary. It was because Kant made this assumption that he was led 

 to regard sensibility and understanding as being disparate, and 

 as needing in some way to be united. It was a similar oversight 

 that led Kant to sever so completely theoretical and practical 

 knowledge, and which caused his fundamental distinction between 

 knowledge and belief. Had the writer of the critiques been true 

 to his own critical method, and commenced with an unprejudiced 

 investigation of the unitary experience, he would have found 

 that, after his analysis, he had certain abstracted constituents of 



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