human experience, which were originally given in one complex 

 whole, which were therefore neither fundamentally diverse, nor, 

 on the other hand, in need of any artificial schematism or arbitrary 

 synthesis. That the theoretical and practical are other than ab- 

 stracted parts of the unitary human experience, that the knowing 

 man is so different from the believing man, that the sensible man 

 is other than the rationa' man, these are assumptions which the 

 analysis of the facts can never substantiate. There may be and, 

 of course, are different classes of facts which go to make up know- 

 edge, but the common origin of all these is the originally occurring 

 unitary human experience. 



Had Kant realized the truth of this position he would never 

 have advanced the arguments which he did to prove that space 

 and time are pure forms of perception. Space, Kant said, is not 

 an empirical concept which has been derived from external experi- 

 ence. It is rather a necessary, a priori idea forming the very foun- 

 dation of all external perceptions. The matter (sensations) of 

 all phenomena is a posteriori', the form, or the order of the arrange- 

 ment of sensations, (space and time), is a priori. In other words, 

 space and time cannot be obtained by an analysis of experience, 

 they are on the contrary in the mind, and, as pure perceptions, 

 exist in the mind as mere forms of sensibility, even when no object 

 is present to the senses. 1 Now what can Kant mean by thus 

 claiming that space and time are pure forms of perception ? 

 That he was quite right in holding that sensational qualities per 

 se cannot explain their order of arrangement must be agreed by 

 all. Sensation plus sensation never can give us space, never can 

 give us time, unless these are already presupposed. But it by no 

 means follows that space and time must belong to a mind to which 

 sensations do not belong. On the contrary, spacial ideas and 

 temporal ideas, or, in other words, spacial and temporal arrange- 

 ments of sensations are found as constituents of a unitary experi- 

 ence. It is by analysis from such an experience and from such 

 constituents of experience that not only sensation but also space 

 and time are finally obtained. So then space and time are not 

 perceptions at all. They are concepts obtained by the analytic 

 investigation of the complex facts of experience. Space as space, 



1 Op. Cit. Cf. Pp. 16-17. 



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