time as time, are never immediately given either as matter or as 

 form. 



Kant, when arguing for his view of space, claims that "it is 

 impossible to imagine that there should be no space, though one 

 might very well imagine that there should be space without objects 

 to fill it". 1 Apparently Kant would hold that it is possible to 

 have a knowledge of space without sensational content. It may 

 be pointed out that this not only runs counter to the tenour of his 

 own argument in the transcendental Logic, where Kant claims 

 that by the union only of the understanding and the senses can 

 knowledge be produced, 2 but, likewise, contradicts all experience. 

 The imagination of even a vacuum does not rid one of sensations. 

 Such an experience must have a sense content simply because the 

 space, whether void of objects or not, is conceived as bounded. 

 Space, Kant contends again, is an a priori perception which neces- 

 sarily precedes all external phenomena. Grant that this necessary 

 preceding is logical only, the statement still is untrue because 

 sensations are equally necessary. No logical priority can be granted 

 to either. If space be " a condition of the possibility of phenomena", 

 sensations likewise are a condition of the possibility of phenomena. 

 The argument which makes one a posteriori, makes the other a 

 posteriori, that makes one a priori, makes the other a priori. In 

 other words, the distinction between a posteriori and a priori as 

 used by Kant breaks down. Kant's contrary declaration is due 

 to his assumption of the possibility of mere space. Similarly with 

 Kant's arguments with regard to time. Space and time, contrary 

 to Kant's view, are both concepts derived from experience. Sen- 

 sation, likewise, is a concept derived in the same way, and it is 

 the analysis of the actually given complex facts which enables us 

 to obtain such concepts. 



Kant advances in the aesthetic another statement which must 

 be called in question, He affirms that space is a pure perception 

 because there is only one space. If we speak of many spaces we 

 mean parts only of one and the same space. Now, if it were granted 

 that space is one, by which Kant apparently meant that it is 

 qualitatively the same throughout all experience, it cannot there- 



1 Op. Cit. P. 19. 



2 Op. Cit. P. 41. 



108 



