fore he contended that space is a perception. It must still be ob- 

 tained from the analysis of experience; it still would be a concept 

 arising in the same way as the concept sensation. But, further- 

 more, though, to be sure, space seems relatively to be one when 

 contrasted with the multitudinous sensational qualities, it is a 

 big assumption on the part of Kant to claim that the space of our 

 perceptions and the space of the geometer, the space of our memories 

 and of our imaginations and of our dreams, visual space and tactual 

 space are all homogeneous. This is a problem the solution of which 

 can come only after careful investigation. Under any circum- 

 stances, it is by no means a self-evident fact that space is one. 

 No doubt it was easier for Kant to assume the unity of space 

 because of his distinction between the inner and outer senses. 

 Space is the form of the external sense only. By means of our 

 external sense, a property of our mind (Gemuth), we represent to 

 ourselves, he says, objects as external and outside ourselves, 

 and all of these in space. Though time is a condition of all pheno- 

 mena, space is a condition of external phenomena only. This 

 doctrine of Kant, since it apparently denies spacial characteristics 

 to our memories and imaginations, is quite untenable. Further- 

 more, Kant seemed not to have realized that only certain of our 

 so-called external sensations, viz. visual and tactual sensations, 

 have spacial extension. 



The transcendental argument, which Kant has also used to 

 establish his view of space, is of course no direct proof that space 

 is a pure perception. If his theory of space did make possible the 

 apodictic certainty of geometry, one would still have to ask the 

 question, is the theory correct, can it be proved by the facts ? 

 Since the theory does not stand the test of fact, we must look 

 elsewhere to understand the supposed necessity and universality 

 of geometry. 



It appears then that Kant, in the very beginning of his critical 

 work; has fallen into no small error. The unwarranted assumption 

 that there are two stems of human knowledge which are different 

 sources of human knowledge manifests itself in the transcendental 

 aesthetic in the kind of differentiation made between sensations 

 on the one hand, and space and time on the other. The conclu- 

 sions of the aesthetic are incorrect. Kant gives us, instead of a 



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