Kant two abstracted parts of human experience. Within man's 

 unitary experience there are found certain processes which might 

 possibly be subsumed under a general term like that of understand- 

 ing. Voluntary combinations of less complex constituents of 

 -experience into more complex processes 1 are generally called, 

 nowadays, apperceptive combinations. Such combinations include 

 those of relating and comparing with the still more complex pro- 

 cesses growing out of these of synthesis and analysis. It is in this 

 connection that the word, understanding, may receive a con- 

 notation which is based on the actual facts. We need not limit 

 the meaning of the word to the " perception of agreements and 

 differences and other derived logical relations between contents 

 of experience", 2 it may possibly be made to include also certain 

 more synthetic functions akin to those illustrated by the activity 

 of the imagination, but, under any circumstances, the facts denoted 

 by the word show, in certain salient respects, a startling lack of 

 agreement with those denoted in the Kantian use of the word. 

 Indeed, Kant's categories of the understanding seem, after all, to 

 be little more than modes of predication. They constitute a number 

 of ways in which assertions may be made in regard to a given 

 subject. Dr. Kirschmann has illustrated this particular point in 

 the following way. His own words are given, "Man betrachte 

 die folgenden beiden Satze: (1) Wenn in einem Dreieck zwei 

 Seiten gleich sind, so sind auch die diesen Seiten gegeniiber liegenden 

 Winkel nicht verschieden. (2) Alle Dreiecke, welche .zwe gleiche 

 Seiten haben, mussen auch zwei diesen gegeniiberliegende gleiche 

 Winkel aufweisen. Das erste dieser Urtheile ist ein besonderes, 

 verneinend, hypothetisch und assertorisch ; das zweite ist allge- 

 mein, bejahend, kategorisch und apodictisch. Trotzdem aber 

 bedeuten beide Urtheile genau dasselbe." 3 The categories, it 

 would then appear evident, represent different forms of predica- 

 tion and not different functions of thought. 4 For Kant himself, 

 however, they certainly meant more than merely modes of predi- 

 cation, in as much as he considered them suggestive, indeed illus- 



1 Cf. Wundt: Outlines of Psychology, 3rd Eng. Edn., Par. 17. 



2 Ibid. P. 301. 



Philosophische Studien Vol. XIX, P. 387, footnote. 



4 For a further criticism, though from a different standpoint, of the categories 

 of Kant, cf. Am. J. of Psy. Vol. 23 Why Kant is Passing: G. Stanley Hall, 

 Pp. 374-380. 



Ill 



