certain principles which transcend sense-experience. The Ideas 

 of Reason, however, because of his assumption in regard to and 

 therefore limitation of the nature of knowledge are claimed by 

 Kant to be unknown. They have no sense content. Now this 

 conclusion to which Kant arrived is very significant. That there 

 are spacial and temporal relations of sensations within the complex 

 of experience no one can deny. That- there are other factors as 

 well, factors that have no sense content whatsoever, is a claim 

 that not only Kant but many others have made. That the objects, 

 which are in experience, when we state a general law or give utter- 

 ance to a universal judgment are sensational objects is doubted 

 by not a few, and it is claimed that experimental evidence can be 

 adduced to prove that there are in experience what might be 

 called objects of thought. That such non-sensuous thinking is 

 possible further and more careful analysis alone must determine. 



Under any circumstances, for Kant there are, as factors of 

 mental operations, sense, understanding and reason. The first 

 two of these are the stems of knowledge. The Ideas, which reason 

 supplies, are not constitutive of knowledge in that strict sense in 

 which the word is employed by Kant. But there were certain 

 problems still to be faced. Kant must ask himself wherein lies 

 the objective validity of knowledge; what, in other words, is to 

 distinguish true scientific knowledge from the mere fancies of 

 imagination ? Now the critique of pure reason claims that the 

 objects of which science has knowledge are phenomena only. 

 They are not unknown and unknowable things-in-themselves, 

 nor, on the other hand are they merely subjective. That which is 

 material or real is not independent of consciousness but "pre- 

 supposes necessarily perception, and cannot be fancied or pro- 

 duced by means of imagination without that perception, which 

 indicates the reality of something in space". 1 "All external per- 

 ception proves immediately something real in space, or rather 

 is that real itself." 2 The objects then with which science deals 

 are not transcendent x's; they cannot be such if for no other reason 

 than that they are in space and time and these are, according to 

 the aesthetic, forms of perception within the mind. Nor are the 

 objects of science merely subjective phantasies, for these objects 



1 Op. Cit. P. 303. 

 Op. Cit. P. 304. 



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