perception or feeling, such a supposed knowledge, Kant claims, is 

 anthropomorphism and the source of superstition, nor is it a know- 

 ledge given in any supersensible perception or feeling which leads 

 only to fanaticism. 1 The predicates, by which we may legiti- 

 mately determine God "are no others than understanding and will, 

 considered too in the relation to each other in which they must 

 be conceived in the moral law, and therefore only so far as a pure 

 practical use is made of them". 2 "There is then a knowledge of 

 God indeed, but only for practical purposes, and if we attempt to 

 extend it to a theoretical knowledge we find an understanding 

 that has intuitions, not thoughts, a will that is directed to objects 

 on the existence of which its satisfaction does not in the least 

 depend." 3 



But, notwithstanding his argument, Kant has, in this regard, 

 placed himself in a strange position. The critical philosophy has 

 secured for man's moral and religious nature inalienable rights, 

 but it has done so at the expense of the unity of man's experience. 

 To divorce so completely as Kant has done the theoretical and 

 the practical is to overlook that fundamental unity of which 

 knowledge and action, science and morals, are only different 

 aspects. When one makes this mistake a sure and certain Nemesis 

 is bound to follow. The difficulties of the second critique reveal 

 the result of this incorrect procedure. The objects of practical 

 reason, so far as they are objects at all, must be given a content, 

 and the predicates by which this is done cannot be other than 

 those or certain of those which apply, likewise, in the realm of 

 theoretical knowledge. Otherwise, morals must dwell in a region 

 of negations only, or of merely formal principles, which can never 

 apply to concrete experience. Kant posits the existence of objects 

 corresponding to the Ideas of Reason. But, if theoretical know- 

 ledge and practical knowledge be so disparate, what can existence 

 mean? Kant allows to man, as moral, freedom, and claims for the 

 soul an immortality, but what positive significance, after all, can 

 there be to such a freedom and such an immortality? It would 

 seem that Kant himself realized, in part, the mistake, for the sum- 

 mum bonum, or final goal of man's practical life, is conceived by 



1 Cr. of Pr. R. f P. 233. 



2 Ibid. P. 234. 

 8 Ibid. P. 235. 



121 



