and directed by gods. In the liberation of human thought from 

 this anthropomorphic, theological stage, man passes next to the 

 metaphysical, where, instead of gods, hypostasized abstractions are 

 supposed to be the explanation of phenomena. The divinities are 

 repudiated, but replaced by souls, essences, tendencies In modern 

 times, however, the positive explanation of facts the ascertainment 

 of their actual relations is gradually superseding the theological and 

 metaphysical explanations. 



Now these views of Comte, and those of Mill and Spencer which 

 show the same tendency, have much to be said on their behalf. 

 Perhaps the most important influence which positivism has had may 

 be seen in the fact that philosophy, as a world-view, has been led to 

 see more clearly than ever that it must not only take cognizance of, 

 but must be based upon the results and procedure of the different 

 special sciences. A philosophy, which is purely speculative, is not a 

 true philosophy. A world- view must endeavour to explain the 

 world, otherwise it soars among the clouds and is bound to prove 

 inadequate. 



The positivism of Comte, however, would deny the possibility of 

 a world-view. Science deals only with the observed facts, philoso- 

 phy is limited to the classification of the different sciences. But 

 such a position overlooks part of the procedure of the special 

 disciplines themselves. For, as we have seen, and as the history 

 of the sciences is showing more and more clearly, theories or hypo- 

 theses are indispensable to the special sciences. The content of 

 science includes the data which are perceived, but also in its ex- 

 planations there are advanced theories and these, though they may 

 and do change, are, nevertheless, part and an important part of 

 science. This Comte's positivism tacitly ignored. When one 

 remembers this, he is enabled to see that positivism does not give an 

 adequate account of philosophy. The very attempt to classify the 

 sciences presupposes a system in which these sciences are. The 

 task of a positive philosophy, as advanced by Comte, is one part 

 on y, therefore, of the work of a true philosophy, a philosophy which 

 cannot properly be limited as Comte would limit it. There is a 

 task to be performed other than that of the mere c'assification of 

 the positive sciences. It is a task which attempts to coordinate all 

 the facts of experience into a system, into a world-view. ./ 



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