A very similar doctrine is held by a growing number of American 

 writers. That this new realism is opposed to idealism is obvious. 

 In an article published recently in the Journal of Philosophy, 

 Psychology and Scientific Methods, Walter T. Marvin of Rutgers 

 College claims that "the long and undisputed reign of idealism is 

 about to enter upon troublous times". And this because "such a 

 movement as neo-realism has already shown enough symptoms to 

 make evident that it is opposed to idealism of every form and 

 variety". 1 The agreement between English neo-realism, as 

 represented mainly by Professor Alexander and Bertrand Russell, 

 and the American neo-realism is, generally speaking, very close. 

 The main point of difference seems to be that the former makes 

 consciousness a "thing" among other things, a term among other 

 terms, whereas the latter makes consciousness a relation dependent 

 upon the terms related. According to Professor Perry, for exam- 

 ple, "when an entity is known or otherwise experienced it is related 

 to a complex". 2 The "complex" is the "knower", of which or of 

 whom the new realism has little apparently to say; consciousness or 

 knowing is not, as in the English writings, on a level with the thing 

 known but is the relation between the knower and the thing known. 3 



In opposing idealism this recent teaching claims to be more in 

 line with the natural sciences and common sense. There is, it 

 claims, a real independent world which may become known but 

 which is not produced or constructed or made possible by mind or 

 consciousness. This extra-mental world is, of course, not the phy- 

 sical world of primary qualities of which Locke spoke. It includes 

 both primary and secondary qualities, or, rather, no such distinc- 

 tion as Locke made is here possible. The real world is a world of 

 colours, sounds, smells as well as of solidity, extension and move- 

 ment. Blue, for example, is an aspect of this real independent 

 world, and is there, in space, over against mind, or, for the American 

 realist, over against the knower. 



It seems evident that the philosophic system %hich the neo- 

 realist will construct from such a standpoint must be much different 



!Op. Cit. Vol. IX (1912), Pp. 309-10. 



2 The New Realism: Cooperative Studies in Philosophy, by E. B. Holt, etc. 

 P. 126. 



Journal of Philosdphy, Psychology etc., Vol. II, P. 309, The Relational 

 Theory of Consciousness by W. P. Montague. Also Ibid. Vol. IX, P. 684, A Point 

 of Difference between American and English Realism by M. T. McClure. 



129 



