from that which is found in idealism. The idealistic tendency has 

 treated mind as a spontaneous activity, a synthetic unity of apper- 

 ception, a synthetic principle the function of which is to make 

 knowledge and nature possible. The word is not used to stand for 

 all the facts or certain abstracted facts of experience. Now the 

 realist advises the idealist to strip himself of such a "prepossession", 

 but, if the realist himself, instead of advancing a new theory of what 

 the mind is or, at least, tacitly assuming a different view thereof, 

 had commenced by an analysis of actual facts, and then had clearly 

 stated to just what facts he was going to apply the word mind or 

 the word knower, many misunderstandings and much argument 

 might be obviated. 



Surely neo-realism, English or American, as well as idealism 

 needs to examine more critically the actually occurring experience, 

 and, for this reason, the importance of experimental psychology, 

 as a preliminary study, should be more fully recognized by both 

 schools. To neglect such a preliminary study is to reverse the 

 proper order ; it is to begin construction by theory and supposition 

 rather than by the sharp and clear-cut analysis of given data. 



The neo-realist assumes that there is a "pre-existing and inde- 

 pendHltly existing" world, which forms an "environment" for 

 consciousness. 1 He thinks that only thus can the work of the 

 natural scientist be understood. Such a real world is not one of 

 space and time and movement only. Realising the impossibility 

 of explaining by these, colours and sounds and smells, the neO- 

 realist goes the whole way and posits independently existing objects 

 to which belong the so-called secondary qualities as well as space 

 and time and movement. Some of these objects under certain 

 conditions may become known, but their becoming known is to them 

 but an incident or happening. Now by what procedure does the 

 neo-realist come to this position? What are the processes which 

 precede and make necessary such a doctrine? These processes the 

 neo-realist has not attempted to delineate. His assumption of an 

 independently existing world is a preliminary assumption, and does 

 not arise from any analysis of the actual operations of knowledge. 

 Nor can it be in any way the result of immediate observation, for, 

 even if it were certain as Alexander holds that he who has any ex- 



1 Cf. Present Philosophical Tendencies: R. B. Perry, P. 322. 



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