minimum of contradiction, and philosophy must ever strive to get 

 rid of even this minimum. 



Now all the sciences proceed by the investigation of some de- 

 finite phenomena usually expressed by the phrase matters-of-fact. 

 This investigation and these matters-of-fact must, therefore, be 

 more closely delineated, and in the first place, reserving for a moment 

 our account of the matters-of-fact, we may attempt to show the 

 nature of the investigation which science pursues. This investiga- 

 tion exhibits two main general characteristics, which may be 

 designated as processes of relating and comparing. 1 Of these two, 

 relating is the wider and more abstract term, since there is no com- 

 paring possible without relating, though there may very well be a 

 relating wherein no comparing finds a place. One may say, for 

 example, that two processes within experience are related when it is 

 seen that one follows the other in temporal sequence. But com- 

 parison takes place when the agreements and differences of the two 

 processes, one with the other, are singled out. When these simple 

 processes of relating and comparing are repeated and combined 

 there arise certain more complex processes which have been named 

 synthesis and analysis. Between these there is no strict line of 

 demarcation. The former however is more closely dependent 

 upon the relating function, and the latter upon the comparing 

 function. Upon a given complexity analysis operates and by 

 determining the agreements and differences within the complex 

 there are obtained as the product of the analysis the elements of 

 the complex which are generally termed concepts. The process 

 itself is called a judgment, and judgments find expression in sen- 

 tences. 



Now, because it is necessary to commence first of all with the 

 originally occurring complexity of experience, the first process must 

 be analytic in form. By analysis there is separated out, in thought, 

 what was originally united. It must not be supposed however that 

 by such an analysis the unity of experience is in any way destroyed. 

 Thought always presupposes such a unity, and the conceptual 

 objects that result are abstract objects, which, though never found 

 as abstract in the original experience, are, nevertheless, derived 

 therefrom. Synthesis is exhibited in the conjoining of these -analy- 



1 Cf. Wundt: Outlines of Psychology, III Rev'd Engl. Edn., Par. 17 



132 



