tic products into greater complexities. To these processes of com- 

 paring and relating, of analysing and synthesizing the general term, 

 thinking, is frequently applied. 



In such propositions as "the sun shines", "sugar is sweet", 

 there are to be seen the simplest kind of judgments; these are based 

 upon the immediate unity of perception, whereas in such judgments 

 as " the sun is a heavenly body", "sugar is a chemical compound ", 

 judgments have arisen which are based not upon such a unity but 

 upon a conceptual unity. The first class of judgments does not 

 presuppose already formed concepts of the sun and its brightness, of 

 sugar and its sweetness, but the immediate perception of the shining 

 sun or the sweet sugar has secured the focus of attention and thus 

 the judgment occurs. In the second class of judgments, concepts 

 of objects are related, concepts which have been previously de- 

 termined by the examination of different judgments of the first 

 class. In such operations of thought there are obtained three 

 kinds of concepts, concepts of objects, concepts of attributes, con- 

 cepts of states, and, corresponding to these are the three gramma- 

 tical forms of substantive, adjective and verb. The various rela- 

 tions in which these concepts stand to one another in the judgment 

 constitute the different forms of judgment. These latter may 

 undergo many transformations, and may have various connections 

 all of which will still be varieties of judgment so that the whole 

 procedure is really an interconnection of judgments. We thus have 

 new relations arising between such judgments, and it is with these 

 relations, common to all science, that logic is concerned. 



Now the relations expressed by the different forms of judgment 

 are reducible to two basic relations, that of identity which may be 

 total or partial and that of dependence which may involve the 

 dependence of one concept upon another or may involve, possibly, 

 the mutual dependence of concepts. Before one can predicate 

 identity or equality between any two concepts, he must first dis- 

 cover the agreements and differences which are present. In such a 

 process of comparison concepts are declared to be equal if, for the 

 prevailing purpose in hand, the agreements outweigh the differences. 

 There is, of course, no such thing as absolute identity, since the 

 concepts are always at least two. If again, on the other hand, the 

 differences are emphasized, then the concepts are declared to be 



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