ledge, should be taken as the content of philosophy and the nature 

 of its task. It is, therefore, only necessary now to outline the way 

 in which philosophy ought to set about its task. 



In searching for an answer regarding the content of the sciences 

 there is really involved the problem of the classification of the 

 sciences. This problem philosophy will best solve by an historical 

 retrospect of the way in which the scientific disciplines have been 

 ramified and elaborated. The historical survey already sketched 

 shows this much, at least, that the individual sciences have all 

 arisen from the observation, classification and explanation of 

 definite matters-of-fact, in the general use of that term. No one 

 would be so absurd as to maintain that the sciences begin e vacua; 

 they all arise from the consideration of observed phenomena. 

 And since, as has just been seen, all sciences follow certain common 

 modes of procedure, the delineation and systematization of which 

 constitute the work of logic, there will be general agreement in 

 regard to what constitutes the starting-point of the sciences and 

 their mode of operation. 



The next stage in the development of science is manifestly the 

 explanation of observed phenomena physical, chemical, biological, 

 etc. Here, wherever possible, resort is made to experiments where- 

 in data may be observed under definitely known conditions. By 

 such experiments, whether they be themselves "natural" opera- 

 tions, or whether they are considered as analogies or epitomes of 

 what occurs in the greater laboratory of nature, the cause of the 

 phenomenon in question is regarded as ascertained. In this pro- 

 cedure, the close relation of the various sciences becomes apparent, 

 for, when they come to the last stages of explanation, it is seen 

 that they use concepts which have much in common. It is the 

 formation and use of such concepts which are of extreme importance 

 for a philosophical inquiry, for the unification of scientific results 

 into a world-view. The point to be insisted on, however, is that 

 such concepts are the specific product of human thinking. They 

 are not among the origina 1 data which formed the starting-point 

 of the special sciences, but are end-results, termini, which are not 

 absolutely final but always capable of modification and finer defin- 

 ition. The rise and operation of these concepts, concepts like 

 matter, force, energy, atom, void, etc., must be carefully and pro- 



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