that the former was supposed to be in some mysterious fashion 

 a copy of the latter. It is at any rate clear that science and philoso- 

 phy have made such a predication. How they have come to do so is 

 a profoundly interesting historical investigation, an investigation 

 which will show that in the formation of the problem philosophy has 

 had as great a share as science, if indeed not a greater. 



In all the forms in which this puzzle has been presented, whether 

 of matter and mind, physical and psychical, body and soul, there has 

 remained the unbridged and, we venture to say, unbridgeable gulf of 

 dualism, unbridgeable, because of the antithetic way in which the 

 two have been denned. For when each is supposed to be totally 

 different from the other, as in the philosophical views of Des Cartes 

 and thousands of his modern successors, there is no way as yet 

 known to man by which they can become united. Under any 

 circumstances it is clear that the content of the sciences includes 

 the observed data, with which they commence, as well as intellectual 

 interpretations or conceptual constructions based upon these data. 



But in these conceptual explanations of observed data there is 

 often the resort to the predication of that which is neither found 

 among any perceived data, that is among any matters of perceived 

 fact, nor regarded as being in any way perceptible, the predication 

 of that which cannot possibly be known, to use Kant's phrase. 

 This is the scientific use of the transcendent, a use which philosophy 

 should patiently examine. 



For when, in the work of philosophy or science, we speak of the 

 infinity of the universe in space and time, and connected therewith 

 of course the Ideas of unlimited matter and unceasing causality, we 

 make use of terms which do not designate anything perceptual 

 or conceptual. Hence such terms as those just mentioned are 

 considered as transcending the observed data as well as the con- 

 cepts derived therefrom, though, to be sure, they are supposed also 

 to be in some kind of relation to them. Following the Platonic and 

 Kantian usage, these transcendents may aptly be called Ideas, to 

 distinguish them from concepts. By these Ideas science is able to 

 make some completion to its treatment of the facts investigated. 

 And it is part of the task of philosophy to make a scrutiny of these 

 Ideas in order to see how they arise and what function they perform. 

 Here it may be seen how these different sciences approach a position 



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