30 PHYSIOLOGY. 



of the sensations of consciousness are thus referred to touch, 

 and confounded with the sensations of impression.'" 



Sensations of Consciousness. 



XL. The sensations of consciousness may be referred to the 

 following heads: 1. Those of apperception, by which we are 

 in general conscious of thinking, of perceiving, judging, and will- 

 ing, and thereby of our existence and identity. 2. The sensa- 

 tions arising from the particular state of thinking, as perception, 

 memory, and judgment, are more or less clear, ready, or ex- 

 act. 3. The sensations arising from the particular state of vo- 

 lition, and its various modes. 4. The sensations arising from 

 the general state of action, as vigorous or weak, easy or difficult. 

 " An example of this is, the sense of alacrity and of weight in 

 moving the limbs ; also, the sense of lassitude. I find that I 

 cannot move my limbs with the same force as I used to do ; I 

 find that I cannot continue their action so long as I have been 

 able to do ; I find a sense of weight and uneasiness in endeav- 

 ouring to do it. This is, plainly, merely a sense of the affec- 

 tion of the mind, and without any thing which can be called ex- 

 ternal impression."" 5. The sensations arising from particular 

 actions, or a consciousness of the actions excited, and of the mo- 

 tion of the different parts of the body. " These, also, probably 

 take place with regard to all the internal functions. The action 

 of the heart and arteries, for instance, is in general more ob- 

 scurely, but sometimes very clearly perceived, as also the state 

 of respiration, or the action of the lungs ; still more evidently 

 the actions of the stomach and intestines, which we cannot con- 

 sider, with any propriety, without having thus distinguished the 

 sensation of consciousness. Still, I own that this head will ad- 

 mit of most doubt, whether these sensations belong to those of 

 consciousness, or to those of impression. I am willing to allow 

 that they are sensations of impression, in so far as the action of 

 the muscles overstretches certain parts ; but sometimes they are 

 without any such impression, and we are conscious only of the 

 degree to which our motions are exerted. Thus, I judge of the 

 distance of a body, which I measure by stretching out my 

 arm to come into contact with it, which is only a consciousness 



