104 PHYSIOLOGY. 



troying the Stahlian system in its foundation, is to establish 

 that the whole medullary origin of the nerves is a sensorium 

 commune. But I carry this further, and state that the brain 

 is not only the organ of the soul, but that, in every motion of 

 the soul, some corporeal motion of the brain accompanies it ; 

 and I add further, 'and so far as a corporeal organ is employed, 

 all the operations of thought, arising in consequence of sen- 

 sation are, operations of the brain, and are modified by its vari- 

 ous condition.' I mean to say that the soul acts by means of 

 the brain, and that it does not act without the brain ; for a full 

 enunciation of which opinion I would refer you to several late 

 writers, and, as it would appear, of the immaterialists. Boer- 

 haave, in his Institutions ( 581.), where he has been explain- 

 ing perception and memory, says, ' Verum omne hoc pendet tan- 

 turn a simplici ilia conditione sensorii communis, quae est ibi 

 mera tanjum mechanica dispositio.' He is more explicit in 

 586, ' Quaenam est in corpore conditio, unde judicium affir- 

 mans, negans, ratiocinium, et methodus ordinate cogitandi 

 pendet ?' He indeed states his opinion in the way of ques- 

 tion ; but, in putting the question, he certainly does suppose 

 a corporeal condition. 



Boerhaave has maintained that the soul and body are two 

 distinct substances, but that during our life in this world they 

 are closely connected with one another : * Corporis statum de- 

 terminatum idem animi status individue comitatur.' This is 

 adduced merely in opposition to the Stahlians, who say that 

 the soul may act separately and independently of the body. 

 Haller's opinion, in his Prim. Lin. ( 578.) I mentioned for- 

 merly (XXXI.) ; he goes very near to the doctrine of Mr. 

 Bonnet, who has maintained that neither in this life, nor in the 

 world to come, can our souls act without the body, and there- 

 fore he infers the necessity of the resurrection of the body. 



" In CXVIII. I mean to insinuate a proposition which I am by 

 no means so intent upon maintaining : That upon many occa- 

 sions the body acts without the soul, and even that in the nerv- 

 ous system there are many actions which may be mechanical."" 



CXVIII. As certain impressions act on the nervous system, 

 without producing any sensation (LXXX.) ; and as, at the 

 same time, there is hardly any communication between the dif 



