108 PHYSIOLOGY. 



of analyzing this motion into all its parts, and I, perhaps, can 

 do it slowly ; but that is what we commonly do not ; and cer- 

 tainly thousands of mankind have no other conception but that 

 of throwing the stone ; and custom, more or less exercise, or 

 experience, enables them to do it with more or less address and 

 agifity, without their willing any more than the effect.'" 



2. The action of the brain is excited by the more general 

 and vehement volitions named EMOTIONS and PASSIONS. Upon 

 occasion of these, the consciousness of willing the particular 

 motions produced is always much less distinct, and in many cases 

 is not at all perceived. Of the last kind are, particularly, most of 

 the expressions of the passions in the countenance and gesture. 



3. By the disposition of human nature to IMITATION. This 

 imitation is sometimes involuntary often without conscious- 

 ness ; and the consciousness which takes place is often of the 

 general purpose only, without that of the particular motions pro- 

 duced ; or, at least, it is of these only as a general effect. " So 

 anciently as by Aristotle man was called ptpiTix.. Whether 

 animals attain to the same power may be questioned ; probably 

 they do not by a great deal. We know the difficulty of resist- 

 ing yawning, and we have many instances of imitation going 

 farther. Upon this foundation, also, we explain the similarity 

 of voice and gesture which prevails in families and countries. I 

 know a person who learned to squint, who before that had no 

 more power of squinting than I have : he was not conscious of 

 squinting, but only of the general purpose of imitation. I have 

 asked some exquisite mimics to analyze their motions, but they 

 could not do it : they cannot tell us wherein the faculty of fea- 

 ture or gesture, which they are resolved to imitate, consists." 



4. By APPETITES or desires, directed to certain external ob- 

 jects, and arising from sensation, without any reasoning direct- 

 ing to an end, at least, without any other end in the first in- 

 stance but that of the gratification of the desire. " Let us con- 

 sider how far the motions here excited are to be considered as 

 rational, voluntary, or instinctive ; take, for instance, the action 

 of deglutition ; we have an arbitrary power over this, we 

 will the action, but the execution of that will is as much of 

 the instinctive kind as any other ; but few persons know 

 any thing of the velum, of the contraction of the glottis, or 



