METHOD OF STUDY. 417 



these circumstances more fully, it is very proper that the sub- 

 ject be seriously considered, that these inconsistencies be avoid- 

 ed, and that the true use and proper limits, both of experience 

 and reasoning, be well understood. In assisting you in this 

 matter, I cannot at present go so far as I could wish, but I sus- 

 pect that the notions of many of you may be too loose and un- 

 determined for my plan, and I shall now say so much as may 

 be necessary to reconcile you to this, and, what is of more con- 

 sequence, to fix your attention to it with some earnestness. 



The object of my present discourse, therefore, shall be to 

 show, that the empiric plan, when employed by itself, is difficult, 

 fallacious, and insufficient ; and that the addition of the dogma- 

 tic is not only really useful but necessary and unavoidable. 



To this purpose I could produce many arguments, but at 

 present I shall confine myself to three only. Thejirst is, that 

 reasoning in physic is unavoidable, and that, to render it safe, it 

 is necessary to cultivate theory in its full extent. 



The second argument is, that supposing the chief object of 

 our study to be the acquiring of facts, the study of a dogmatic 

 system has been the chief means of obtaining those which we 

 have already acquired, and is also the most certain means of ac- 

 quiring those we still want : it is therefore useful and necessary. 



Our third argument is, that there is no tolerable foundation 

 for the study of physic upon an empiric plan, and that all at- 

 tempts hitherto made towards delivering it upon that footing, 

 have been not only fruitless but pernicious. 



These arguments require to be explained more fully ; and I 

 now proceed to do it. 



The first argument then is, that reasoning in physic is una- 

 voidable, and that, to render it safe, it is necessary to cultivate 

 theory in its full extent. I maintain this by observing, that 

 there is in human nature a strong propensity to seek for causes, 

 and to assign them also on the slightest grounds ; and mankind 

 are very generally guided in their affairs by their judgment of 

 causes and effects. I must own, indeed, that there is nothing 

 more weak or false than their reasonings often are ; but I ima- 

 gine the propensity is irresistible. Sceptics and Academics may 

 demonstrate the fallacy, or the rash presumption of human rea- 

 soning, but thev will never persuade men to give it up, nor even 



