476 PRACTICE OF PHYSIC. 



the errors which have formerly taken place in the Institu- 

 tions of medicine. It is possible also for a person who has an 

 extensive knowledge of the facts relative to the animal econ- 

 omy in health and in sickness, by a cautious and complete in- 

 duction v to establish many general principles which may guide 

 his reasoning with safety ; and while, at the same time, a physi- 

 cian admits as a foundation of practice those reasonings only 

 which are simple, obvious, and certain, and for the most part 

 admits as proximate causes those alone that are established as 

 matters of fact rather than as deductions of reasoning, he may 

 with great advantage establish a system of practice chiefly 

 founded on the doctrine of proximate causes. But when this 

 cannot be done with sufficient certainty, the judicious and pru- 

 dent physician will have recourse to Experience alone ; always, 

 however, aware of the hitherto incomplete and fallacious state of 

 Empiricism. 



" That experience is to be consulted, is the vulgar cry of 

 every one who has. not had the opportunity of studying, or the 

 capacity of understanding theory, and it is too generally the cry 

 of those who know not the hitherto incomplete and fallacious 

 state of Empiricism. Haec nosse salus est adolescentiae. 

 They ought to know the difficulty of Observation ; from the 

 number of circumstances to be observed, from the difficulty 

 of estimating these exactly, even by the physician's senses, and 

 still more so by the patient's feelings ; from the number of ob- 

 servations necessary, while exact resemblance is never found, in 

 order to distinguish the constant from the accidental, the speci- 

 fic from the generic ; from the difficulty of guarding against the 

 fallacy of temperaments, age, sex, climate, &c. in the condition 

 and administration of remedies, and many other circumstances ; 

 from the difficulty of guarding against the mistakes and de- 

 ceit of patients. 



" The uncertainty of observations is thus shown, and all that 

 uncertainty must pass into history, which must be further uncer- 

 tain from the inaccuracy, and therefore the fallacy, of language 

 in general, and from that of particular persons. 



" These considerations point out the uncertainty of facts; 

 but, what is worse, there are false facts, from the design of sup- 

 porting favourite theories, from the design of supporting par- 



