WILLIAM TILGHMAN. 41 



law of Pennsylvania, or rather the reiterated recog- 

 nition by the Bench, that with few exceptions they 

 form an inseparable part of that law. 



The distinction between law and equity is well un- 

 derstood by the Profession, but difficult to explain to 

 popular apprehension. It is a great but prevalent 

 mistake, to suppose that a Court of Equity is the re- 

 proach of the common law, whereas it is its praise; 

 at least the praise of its illustrious origin. The Com- 

 mon Law, being originally the law of freemen, of 

 that Saxon stock from which is derived the freest 

 race upon earth, left nothing to the discretion of the 

 Judge or the Monarch. It was itself the great arbi- 

 ter, and ruled every question by principles of great 

 certainty and general application. In its earliest day, 

 a day of comparative simplicity, its general principles 

 and forms embraced and adjusted almost every trans- 

 action: and when they did not, the authority of the 

 Common Law Courts was legitimately extended by 

 new writs devised in the then incipient Chancery. 

 The refinements of later times, the invention of uses, 

 and afterwards of trusts, the complications of trade, 

 the defects incident to the multiplied operations of 

 men, all tended to produce controversies which the 

 Judges of the Common Law could not, consistently 

 with their integrity and the integrity of their rules, 

 adjust with perfect effect ; and hence the development 

 of the Court of Chancery. It is a great misconcep- 

 tion of that Court, to suppose that it overturns the 

 Common Law. Equity is a part of the Common 



