THE PROBLEM OF THE WILL ^3 



closes Chapter II. as follows : " At this pomt, then, 

 I hope to have said enough to establish my second 

 proposition, and having first proved to the meta- 

 physician that consciousness does not tell him 

 that he has such a will as he imagines, to have 

 now proved that it has not the authority to tell 

 him that his will is undetermined. He has based 

 upon its declaration a superstructure which it is 

 unable to bear. Be the doctrine of an undeter- 

 mined entity true or not, consciousness is not 

 competent to decide the question by an immediate 

 intuition." ^ It does not seem to me that Dr. 

 Maudsley proves his assertions. At first, indeed, 

 it appears as if even consciousness itself must be 

 modified by the physical constitution ; as if it had 

 various degrees of intensity and validity ; but, on 

 second thought, that is not so evident. For 

 instance, a man knows that he exists ; conscious- 

 ness tells him so ; and the vividness of that 

 knowledge is not in any way dependent on either 

 heredity, or environment, or bodily condition. I 

 think — consciousness tells me that ; I will — 

 consciousness tells me that ; and that knowledge 

 is at first hand, and entirely untouched by the sub- 

 sequent inquiry as to whether what I think and 

 what I will are determined by causes having exis- 



1 Body and Will., Maudsley, p. 36. 



