THE GEEM OF SCIE^^CE EN ORDE^AEY KNOWLEDGE. 117 



lug in what times, places, combinations, or sequences, spe- 

 cified phenomena will be found ; we are yet obliged to con 

 fess that the definition includes much that is utterly foreign 

 to science in its ordinary acceptation. For example, a child's 

 knowledge of an apple. This, as far as it goes consists in 

 previsions. When a child sees a certain form and colours, 

 it knows that if it puts out its hand it will have certain im- 

 pressions of resistance, and roundness, and smoothness; 

 and if it bites, a certain taste. And manifestly its general 

 acquaintance with surrounding objects is of like nature — ^is 

 made up of facts concerning them, so grouped as that any 

 part of a group being perceived, the existence of the other 

 facts included in it is foreseen. 



If, once more, we say that science is exact prevision, we 

 still fail to establish the supposed difference. Not only do 

 we find that much of what we call science is not exact, 

 and that some of it, as physiology, can never become exact ; 

 but we find further, that many of the previsions constitu- 

 ting the common stock alike of wise and ignorant, are ex- 

 act. That an unsupported body will fall ; that a lighted candle 

 will go out when immersed in water ; that ice will melt 

 when thrown on the fire — these, and many like predictions 

 relating to the familiar properties of things have as high a 

 degree of accuracy as predictions are capable of. It is true 

 that the results predicated are of a very general character ; 

 but it is none the less true that they are rigorously correct 

 as far as they go : and this is all that is requisite to fulfil 

 the definition. There is perfect accordance between the 

 anticipated jDhenomena and the actual ones ; and no more 

 than this can be said of the highest achievements of the 

 sciences specially characterised as exact. 



Seeing thus that the assumed distinction between scien- 

 tific knowledge and common knowledge is not logically 

 justifiable ; and yet feeling, as we nmst, that however im- 

 possible it may be to draw a line between thejii, the two 



