146 THE GEXESIS OF SCIENCE. 



inosculate ; they severally send off and receive connecting 

 growths ; and the intercommunion has been ever becom- 

 ing more frequent, more intricate, more widely ramified. 

 There has all along been higher specialization, that there 

 might be a larger generalization ; and a deeper analysis, 

 that there might be a better synthesis. Each larger gen- 

 eralization has lifted sundry specializations still higher ; and 

 each better synthesis has prepared the way for still deeper 

 analysis. 



And here we may fitly enter upon the task awhile since 

 indicated — a sketchy of the Genesis of Science, regarded as 

 a gradual outgrowth from common knowledge — an exten- 

 sion of the perceptions by the aid of the reason. We pro- 

 pose to treat it as a psychological process historically dis- 

 played ; tracing at the same time the advance from qualita- 

 tive to quantitative prevision ; the progress from concrete 

 facts to abstract facts, and the aj^plication of such abstract 

 facts to the analysis of new orders of concrete facts ; the 

 simultaneous advance in gereralization and speciahzation ; 

 the continually increasing subdivision and reunion of the 

 sciences ; and their constantly improving consensus. 



To trace out scientific evolution from its deepest roots 

 would, of course, involve a complete analysis of the mind. 

 For as science is a development of that common knowledge 

 acquired by the unaided senses and uncultured reason, so 

 is that common knowledge itself gradually built up out of 

 the simplest perceptions. "We must, therefore, begin 

 somewhere abruptly ; and the most appropriate stage 

 to take for our point of departure will be the adult mind 

 of the savage. 



Commencing thus, without a proper preliminary analy- 

 sis, we are naturally somewhat at a loss how to. present, in 

 a satisfactory manner, those fundamental processes of 

 thought out of which science ultimately originates. Per- 



