BODILY FEELINGS AND MENTAL STATES. 293 



point of the method to be chosen, for the same mode of diffusion 

 will always be accompanied by the same mental experience, and 

 each of the two aspects would identify, and would be evidence 

 of, the other. There is, therefore, nothing so thorouglily char- 

 acteristic of any state of feeling as the nature of the diffusive 

 wave that embodies it, or the various organs specially roused 

 into action by it, together with the manner of the action. The 

 only drawback is our comparative ignorance, and our inability 

 to discern the precise character of the diffusive currents in every 

 case ; a radical imperfection in the science of mind as constituted 

 at present. 



" Our own consciousness, formerly reckoned the only medium 

 of knowledge to the mental philosopher, must therefore be still 

 referred to as a principal means of discriminating the varieties of 

 human feeling. We have the power of noting agreement and 

 difference among our conscious states, and on this we can raise a 

 structure of classification. We recognise such generalities as 

 pleasure, pain, love, anger, through the property of mental or 

 intellectual discrimination that accompanies in our mind the fact 

 of an emotion. A certain degree of precision is attainable by 

 this mode of mental comparison and analysis ; the farther we 

 can carry such precision the better; but that is no reason why it 

 should stand alone to the neglect of the corporeal embodiments 

 through which one mind reveals itself to others. The compan- 

 ionship of inward feeling with bodily manifestation is a fact of 

 the human constitution, and deserves to be studied as such ; and 

 it would be diflScult to find a place more appropriate than a 

 treatise on the mind for setting forth the conjunctions and 

 sequences traceable in this department of nature. I shall make 

 no scruple in conjoining with the description of the mental 

 phenomena the physical appearances, in so far as I am able to 

 ascertain them. 



" There is still one other quarter to be referred to in settling a 

 complete arrangement of the emotions, namely, the varieties of 

 human conduct, and the machinery created in subservience to our 

 common susceptibilities. For example, the vast superstructure of 

 fine art has its foundations in human feeling, and in rendering an 

 account of this we are led to recognise the interesting group of 

 artistic or a}sthetic emotions. The same outward reference to 



