308 BAIN ON THE EMOTIONS AND THE WILL. 



sensations. IN'ow this distinction, tacitly made in common 

 speech, is one which Psychology cannot well reject ; but one 

 which it must adopt, and to which it must give scientific 

 precision. Mr. Bain, however, appears to ignore any such 

 distinction. Under the term " emotion," he includes not 

 only passions, sentiments, affections, but all " feelings, states 

 of feeUng, j^leasures, pains," — that is, all sensations. This 

 does not appear to be a mere lapse of expression ; for when, 

 in the opening sentence, he asserts that *' mind is comprised 

 under the three heads — Emotion, Volition, and Intellect," 

 he of necessity implies that sensation is included under one 

 of these heads ; and as it cannot be included under Volition 

 or Intellect, it must be classed with Emotion : as it clearly 

 is in the next sentence. 



We cannot but think this is a retrograde step. Though 

 distinctions which have been established in popular thought 

 and language, are not unfrequently merged in the higher 

 generalizations of science (as, for instance, when crabs and 

 worms are grouped together in the sub-kingdom Annu- 

 losa /) yet science very generally recognizes the validity of 

 these distinctions, as real though not fundamental. And so 

 in the present case. Such community as analysis discloses 

 between sensation and emotion, must not shut out the 

 broad contrast that exists between them. If there needs a 

 wider word, as there does, to signify any sentient state 

 whatever; then we may fitly adopt for this purpose the 

 word currently so used, namely, " Feeling." And consid- 

 ering as Feelings all that great division of mental states 

 which we do not class as Cognitions, may then separate 

 this great division into the two orders. Sensations and Emo- 

 tions. 



And here we may, before concluding, briefly indicate 

 the leading outlines of a classification which reduces this 

 distinction to a scientific form, and developes it somewhat 



