m 



natives with Europeans in the district courts was four-fold ; 

 viz., firstly, to secure correct appreciation of the evidence given 

 before the court by a native judge familiar with the language, 

 turns of thought and devices of native witnesses ; secondly, 

 to secure impartiality of decision ; thirdly, to limit the number 

 of appeals; and fourthly to afford opportunities for legal 

 training to European officers, who may be called upon to fill 

 high judicial offices. As regards the necessity for a plurality 

 of judges to form a court, Mr. Strange observed : " The 

 assistance and check which one judge provides to another 

 when working together on the same bench, even when the one 

 is inferior to the other, few, I imagine, will fail to recognize. 

 As respects the number of the judges to form the bench, 

 I have been in the habit of sitting in a court consisting, 

 sometimes of two judges, and sometimes of three. I much 

 prefer the court of two judges for working purposes. Two 

 judges can literally put their heads together. The presence 

 of a third, dividing the other two from each other, produces 

 a physical impediment to close consultation. I believe, more- 

 over, that a case is apt to receive greater consideration on 

 a difference of opinion arising, when two judges form the 

 court than when there are three. The one has to per- 

 suade the other, but if a third be present and prematurely 

 interposes an expression of opinion, a majority may be 

 formed and the case terminated without proper discussion." 

 For the Provincial courts Mr. Strange proposed to have 

 only a single judge — a covenanted civilian. As regards ap- 

 peals, where the judges of the District courts differed 

 on any point of fact in any suit a reference was to be 

 made to the Provincial judge, who, in this way, would stand 

 as a third judge or referee to each such court. The reference 

 was to be made without expense to the parties who were, 

 however, to be at liberty to be present and conduct the case in 

 the superior court. Where the judges of the District court 

 liffered on a point of law the reference was to be made to 

 the High court. The decision of the Provincial court was 

 to be final on the facts of the case, but if that court differed 

 from the District court on a point of law in a case thus 

 referred for decision of fact, the Provincial court was to 

 refer the point of law for adjudication by the Presidency 

 court. By a question of fact, Mr. Strange meant the question 

 of the credibility of testimony, oral and documentary ; and 

 the points of law on which Mr. Strange would allow an 

 appeal, he defined to be, first, the refusal to admit to hearing 

 any material evidence; second, the misconstruction of any 



