3/' 



THE NEW BOOK OF THE DOG. 



to contlirling judicial opinions. Blackburn, 

 J., in the case of Liver Alkali Company v. 

 Jolmson, said : " It is difficult to see any 

 reason why the liability of a shipowner who 

 engages to carry the whole lading of his 

 ship for one person should be less than the 

 liability of one who carries lading in different 

 parcels for different people." .\nd he added 

 that the liability of a lighterman was ex- 

 pressly recognised as being the same as that 

 of a common carrier. Brett, J. (afterwards 

 Lord Esher, :\I.R.), held on a review of 

 the authorities that shipowners, though not 

 common carriers, yet by custom, i.e. the 

 common law of England, have the same 

 liability. " Every shipowner who carries 

 goods for hire in his ship, whether by inland 

 navigation or coastways or abroad, under- 

 takes to carry them at his own risk, the act 

 of God and the Queen's enemies alone 

 excepted, unless by agreement between 

 himself and the particular freighter on the 

 particular voyage he limits his liability by 

 further exceptions." In the case of Nugent 

 V. Smith (I.C.P.D. 25 and 427), Brett, J., 

 repeated this opinion, but when this case 

 was taken higher on appeal, Cockburn, C.J., 

 in his judgment, dissented emphatically from 

 Brett, J., and also from Blackburn, J., in 

 his judgment in the other case, saying there 

 was a clear distinction between the common 

 carrier and the private ship. It seems, 

 however, that the balance of authority and 

 principle is in fa^•our of the \'iew expressed 

 by the late Lord Esher, supported as it is 

 by the judgments of other able judges, such 

 as Lord Justice Bowen, who in the well- 

 known case of Hamilton v. Pandorf, used 

 very similar language. 



The shipowner, nowadays, in carrying 

 anything, seeks to limit his liability in every 

 way that he possibly can, his bill of lading 

 is invariably full of exceptions, limitmg his 

 liability as far as it is possible for the human 

 mind to conceive. This is especially so in 

 connection with the shippers of dogs, horses, 

 and other animals, and when a dog does on 

 its voyage meet with any injury, or is maybe 

 lost, it may, as a general rule, be safely stated 

 that it is hopeless to bring any action against 

 the shipowner on account of the same, no 



matter how the injury or loss has occurred. 

 Of course if a shipowner is so foolish as to 

 ship a dog without a bill of lading, and 

 the dog be injured or lost on account of 

 something which cannot be called an act 

 of God or of the King's enemies, another 

 situation altogether arises, and the dog 

 owner would find himself in clo\"er, but 

 " Simple Simons " among shipowners are 

 nowadays not numerous, and though it is 

 true no mmiber of express exceptions in a 

 bill of lading can of a certainty be said to 

 be exhaustive, yet so many cases have 

 arisen of recent years between shipowners 

 and shippers, and so many judgments have 

 been given that the exceptions in these 

 agreements must now not only cover almost 

 everything, but are worded in such a way 

 that even the ingenuity of great lawyers 

 will, as a rule, fail to get behind them. 



An interesting case, recently tried in the 

 High Court before Mr. Justice Walton, is a 

 good example of what a poor chance a dog- 

 owner has against a shipowner. In this 

 case (Packwood v. Union Castle Mail Steam- 

 ship Company) the plaintiff shipped two 

 prize Collies in a kennel from London to 

 Cape Town under a bill of lading, which 

 contained the following among other terms 

 and conditions: "On deck at shipper's 

 risk. Ship not accountable for mortality, 

 disease or accidents " ; " The company are 

 not liable for, or for the consequences of, any 

 accidents, loss, or damage whatsoever arising 

 from any act, neglect, or default whatsoever 

 of the masters, officers, crew or any agent 

 or servant of the company " ; and " Xo claim 

 that may arise in respect of goods shipped 

 under this bill of lading will be recoverable 

 unless made at the port of delivery witlfin 

 seven days from the completion of the ship's 

 discharge there." 



The dogs were duly shipped on board 

 the s.s. Galiciaii, and during the voyage one 

 of them was lost o\-erboard, m consequence 

 of its being let out of its kennel by someone 

 in the employ of the defendants, and being 

 allowed to go loose about the ship for the 

 purpose, as the defendants alleged, " of 

 getting exercise, which was a reasonable 

 measure necessarv for the health of the said 



