1 70 Habit and Instinct. 



first performance of an instinctive activity, whether 

 imitative or not, affords the data to consciousness for 

 the perfecting or the modification of the activity and the 

 formation of instinct habits— that is to say, acquired 

 modifications of congenital responses. Given, therefore, 

 a congenital and instinctive imitation, intelligence may 

 utilize it as the basis of an imitative action of the conscious 

 type. To such conscious or intentional imitation we may 

 now turn. 



When a child consciously and of set purpose tries to 

 imitate another child or an older person, his action is in 

 all cases founded on a certain amount of preliminary 

 experience. Let us suppose that he is imitating the action 

 of another in tracing with a pencil a simple curve. This 

 is impossible unless he have already acquired some data in 

 the light of which control over his arm and finger move- 

 ments may be exercised. His object is to apply this 

 control in such a way as to reproduce the movements of 

 the other so as to obtain the same results. He must have 

 some data to work with. Either instinctive imitation has 

 afforded such data, or acquired experience of the use of his 

 limbs and fingers has taught him that, to do this thing 

 which another is doing, and so reach similar results, he 

 must guide his movements in certain definite ways. Given 

 such preliminary data, further progress would seem to be a 

 matter of trial and error, the repressing of such movements 

 as lead to failure, the emphasizing and repeating of such 

 movements as lead to success. Failure is accompanied by 

 more or less painful dissatisfaction; success, by more or 

 less pleasurable satisfaction. Thus, step by step, further 

 control is gained until the imitative action is sufficiently 

 perfect. 



It would be convenient to distinguish between two allied, 

 but at the same time somewhat different, processes ; and 



