200 Habit and Instinct. 



from our present consideration that form of pain which 

 accompanies some organic lesion. A cut, a prick, a sprain, 

 a toothache, a tearing of the tissues, an inflammatory 

 process — any one of these, or their like, requires, it may be 

 urged, a consideration quite independent of that which 

 deals with the pleasure or discomfort that accompanies 

 the normal performance of certain activities. Leaving 

 pain of this kind on one side, as possibly requiring a 

 different explanation, I accept the interpretation of those 

 who regard pleasure and its antithesis as qualities, rather 

 than separate elements, of consciousness. To put the 

 matter picturesquely, in the absence of pleasure and its 

 antithesis, there would be in consciousness a picture in 

 neutral tints — one which would neither attract nor repel. 

 Pleasure and its opposite give the picture colour, and make 

 it either attractive or repellent. Pleasures and pains on 

 this view are, as Mr. Marshall puts it, qualities either of 

 which, under the proper conditions, may belong to any 

 element in consciousness. 



Now for the bearing of this on the view that an emotion 

 is predominantly or solely due to motor elements supplied 

 by the performance of such an instinctive activity as the 

 moorhen's early morning dance. It may be suggested 

 that the motor elements provide the neutral-tint picture, 

 while the distinctively emotional character of the states of 

 consciousness is due to the colouring of the picture in tones 

 of pleasure and pain. On this view the primary basis of 

 an emotional state is afforded by the pleasurable or painful 

 tone which suffuses the whole background of consciousness 

 during the performance of certain instinctive or habitual 

 activities, and accompanies the multitudinous motor 

 elements, thus crowding in upon consciousness. 



From the standpoint of introspection the pleasurable 

 or painful accompaniment of activity-feelings is apparently 



